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ABSTRACT 
 
Terminal LPG Semarang as one of vital facilities in handling hydrocarbon 
energy for cooking fuel covering Northern Central Java region is one of appealing 
subject to do safety assessment, espescially fire risk assessment. The importance 
of the assessment is inevitable since in similar facility such as Terminal LPG 
Cilacap there was already an fire occurence that lead in conclussion that it’s fire 
fighting equipment cannot overcome incoming incident. The unavailability of fire 
risk assessment in Terminal LPG Semarang also has inevitable escalation since the 
specific action that need to be taken during certain fire incident have not planned 
well. This research are focusing to do the Quantitative Risk Assessment as an 
baseline for determining the Fire Risk and its hazard potency. The process are 
involving performing Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) based on Terminal System 
P&ID, Frequency analysis such as Fault Tree Analysis and Event Tree Analysis, and 
Consequences analysis using Process Hazard Analysis Software Tools, and risk 
representation using Company Risk Matrix. And the result will be baseline to 
arrange Pre Fire Planning Assessment based on the possible event that may occur 
and analyze Terminal Fire Fighting Facility wether it can overcome the possible 
occurence or not. The concern to model the outcome of the fire risk are to 
determine what the output based on various leak scenario such as: 3 mm, 10 mm, 
50 mm, and 150 mm bore diameter. The result concluded that in the operational 
process of the LPG system there are several potential hazard such as: 
overpressure, high temperature, high flow rate, and blockage of the system that 
can lead into failure of the system caused gas leak and then gas released from 
the system. The frequency analysis conclude the node involved in Loading Line 
has the higher frequency, meanwhile the lowest frequency located on system 
which involved the storage tank. The consequences modelling show the effect of 
the scenario is differ based on the working parameter of the corresponding 
facility. The risk representation shows that affected zone based on leak scenarios 
shows that several locations are located in high risk area of fire hazard and need 
special attention regarding its Terminal’s ability to overcome the possible 
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scenarios. The high risk level in need of special attention will become baseline to 
dtermine the mitigation plan, or so called the Pre Fire Planning. To overcome the 
potential hazard mitigation plan found that Terminal LPG Semarang need 
improvement at their fire extinguishing equipment such as improvement of water 
supply capacity as fire extinguishing agent by atleast 4.000 m3.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
Terminal LPG Semarang sebagai salah satu fasilitas vital yang menunjang 
aktivitas bongkar muat dan distribusi LPG sebagai bahan bakar untuk kebutuhan 
rumah tangga yang mencakup area Jawa Tengah muncul sebagai salah satu 
objek yang cukup vital untuk dilakukan penilaian risiko risiko kebakaran. Hal ini 
didasarkan pada fakta bahwa pada fasilitas serupa pada Depot LPG Cilacap telah 
terjadi kasus kebakaran pada tangki timbun LPG yang dimilik Depot LPG Cilacap. 
Ekskalasi yang akan dihadapi yang akan dihadapi juga tidak terbantahkan 
terutama ketika ketidatersediaan penilaian risiko kebakaran mengakibatkan 
rencana mitigasi menjadi tidak terpetakan. Riset ini menekankan kepada 
penilaian risiko secara kuantitatif untuk menentukan level resiko. Proses penilaian 
dilakukan dengan menggunakan metode Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study 
untuk menilai potensi bahaya yang didasarkan pada bagaimana keseluruhan 
sistem di terminal bekerja, Analisa Frekuensi menggunakan metode Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) dan Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Analisa konsekuensi menggunakan 
perangkat lunak Process Hazard Analysis Software Tools, dan representasi risiko 
menggunakan Company Risk Matrix. Proses analisa dibatasi hanya dengan 
memodelkan kemungkinan-kemungkinan dari kebucoran instalasi 
menggunakan variasi kebocoran sebesar 3 mm, 10 mm, 50 mm, dan 150 mm. 
Hasil dari penilaian risko secara kuantitatif kemudian akan menjadi dasar analisa 
mitigasi kebakaran atau Pre Fire Planning untuk menganalisa kemampuan dari 
fasilitas pemadam pada Terminal LPG Semarang. Hasil dari keseluruhan penilaian 
risiko ditemukan bahwa dalam kegiatan operasi terminal ditemukan potensi 
bahaya dari kegagalan seperti overpressure, temperatur tinggi, flow rate tinggi 
dapat menyebabkan eskalasi yang menyebabkan kegagalan komponen yang 
mengakibatkan kebocoran gas. Analisa frekuensi menemukan bahwa frekuensi 
tertinggi terdapat dalam sistem bongkar LPG dari kapal pengangkut LPG, 
sedangkan frekuensi terendah ditemukan pada sistem yang melibatkan tangki 
timbun LPG. Dari analisa konsekuensi ditemukan bahwa kkonsekuensi tertinggi 
ditemukan pada sistem yang melibatkan tangki timbun dimana faktor yang 
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menyebabkan hal tersebut adalah banyaknya jumlah LPG yang terdapat pada 
tangki timbun dibanding sistem lainnya. Dalam proses representasi resiko 
ditemukan bahwa konsekuensi dari beberapa skenario tidak dapat ditangani oleh 
fasilitas yang ada sehingga membutuhkan sebuah rencana mitigasi yang 
dituangkan dalam Pre Fire Planning. Dari perencanaan mitigasi ditemukan bahwa 
beberapa parameter fasilitas tidak memenuhi syarat untuk mengatasi skenario 
yang menjadi tinjauan. Salah satu fasilitas yang perlu dilakukan peningkatan 
kemampuannya adalah peningkatan kapasitas suplai air pemadam sebanyak 
setidaknya 4.000 m3. 
 
Keywords: LPG, QRA, HAZOP, ETA, FTA, Consequences Modelling 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1.  Background 
Terminal LPG Semarang is one of strategic facility in the supply chain of LPG 
covering the Indonesia’s Central Java region. Terminal LPG Semarang which its 
main business activity are involving receiving, storage, and distribution activity 
involving 1600 MT – 2000 MT  of LPG uses as household needs as cooking fuel 
each day is the one of the National Vital Object (OBVITNAS) that need higher 
practice of risk management to minimize the fatal risk or accident that may occur. 
As one of the facilities that handling the hydrocarbons material that most 
likely risk occurrence that may occur is the fire and explosion even though the 
event of another occurrence such as release and dispersion, the consequences of 
two another occurrence when its ignite are inevitable. Based on that background 
Terminal LPG Semarang is one of subject that to be most likely appeal to do an 
research in safety assessment due to the absences of any specific analysis or 
assessment regarding emergency action to overcome certain accident such as 
fire or explosion of its facility. One of the chain reaction that occur due to its 
absences is the authorities are blindly does not know how big the effect of 
accident can affect the surrounding or how much the amount of action need to 
be taken for specific accident since the consequences have a lot of variations and 
type of accident that may occur. The location of Terminal LPG Semarang which 
located in the Tanjung Emas Port area as seen on Figure 1.1.  which act as main 
gateway of sea transportation at Central Java region is also creates such a concern 
that the effect also affected Port activity and not only cause loses in operational 
or lives in Terminal LPG Semarang but also disturb Port of Tanjung Emas activity. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Location of Terminal LPG Semarang 
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Another reason why fire risk assessment and pre fire planning such an 
important thing is that in similar facility (LPG Terminal) in Cilacap, Central Java 
Province. On Thursday 22 March 2012 at 10.00 PM on Cilacap LPG Terminal 
storage tank F which contains mixed LPG is ongoing LPG supplying into that tank 
from RU IV T-105 tank. Suddenly the fire spark occurs on the roof side of the tank, 
and the tank also suffers a leakage on pressure release valve causing a fire on 
relief valve. The fire first saw by one of the employees and immediately reported 
into tank security officer. 
The consequences modelling of this case is using software called ARCHIE to 
determine the effect of the event. The result of the modelling later become the 
baseline to evaluate the existing firefighting equipment in Depot LPG Cilacap. The 
result of the assessment concluding that certain firefighting facility is not comply 
with the minimum requirement based on NFPA (National Fire Protection Agency). 
The recommendation of this paper is to evaluate the facility to overcome the 
event in the future based on a recent accident that happened. The affected area 
of the leakage can be seen in Figure 1.2.  
 
 
Figure 1.2 Terminal Layout Cilacap LPG Terminal (Pertmina HSSE Jawa Tengah, 2012) 
 
The major concern why this thesis is focused on fire risk is that because 
Terminal LPG Semarang is concerning  to create such as pre fire planning 
assessment that using the Process Hazard Analysis Software Tools as an 
consequences modelling tools to predict the incident outcome consequences, or 
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so called quantitative risk assessment. But as the stage in risk assessment cannot 
suddenly to modelling the outcome without doing another assessment to 
support the consequences modelling that can become baseline for pre fire 
planning or fire risk assessment. 
To do the complete fire risk assessment several methods also need to do as 
a complete schematic stage to perform a risk assessment. First is to determine 
the hazard that may occur using HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) method. This 
will reveal potential hazard in every component that involving in Terminal’s 
operation. 
The next stage performs the frequencies analysis and the system failure 
analysis. As each components potential hazard that may occur already examine 
in HAZOP assessment, the system failure, and its consequences also need to be 
determined. At this stage, the idea of using FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) and ETA 
(Event Tree Analysis) will be used. Event trees and fault trees are logic diagrams 
used to represent, respectively, the effects of an event and the contributory 
causes of an event (Mannan, 2005). 
The next step is to modelling the possible outcome from FTA and ETA analysis 
using Consequences Modelling. Consequences modelling is a method to predict 
or calculate the physical damage and losses or how big the area is threatened 
due to a certain accident involving hazardous or toxic substances in oil & gas, 
processing, distribution, and transmission industry. The visual outcome can be 
seen in Figure 1.3. In one case the end point of the consequences can be 
predicted as well as the amount of heat radiation or flux during the event.  
On this thesis, the software that chosen is Process Hazard Analysis Software 
Tools. Process Hazard Analysis Software Tools is one of most comprehensive 
hazard analysis software for all stages including process industry, design, and 
operation will very comply with the problem above, since Process Hazard Analysis 
Software Tools is can analyze the present potential hazard that may occur 
accurately and also provide clear illustration of the outcomes that may result from 
the modelling process. Process Hazard Analysis Software Tools is also in 
compliance with the safety regulations that are strictly monitored in oil and gas 
industry. Regarding the background above doing the consequences modelling 
using Process Hazard Analysis Software Tools can be used as a platform for 
Terminal LPG Semarang to create such as detailed and specific assessment (DNV, 
2014). 
The outcome of consequences modelling can be a platform for determining 
the firefighting evaluation based on NFPA standard. The evaluation is consist of 
calculation of the water requirement to prevent higher escalation causalities 
caused by the former incident. This firefighting evaluation asses whether the 
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existing facility in Terminal LPG Semarang are capable to overcome fire incident 
that may occur. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3 Consequences Modelling Result (UltraTech Environmental Consultancy and 
Laboratory, 2015) 
 
All the methods that being implemented hopefully become a 
recommendation for Terminal LPG Semarang as an platform to perform further 
risk assessment and also evaluation for their facility so that in the future there will 
be major safety improvement in Terminal LPG Semarang. 
 
1.2.  Statement of the Problem 
The process of thesis is to determine several problem that have to be 
answered during the research, in this thesis the problem are: 
1. How to determine the Hazard and Operability Scenario on Terminal LPG 
Semarang using BS IEC 61882-2001 HAZOP standard? 
2. How to analyze the system failure and event frequencies using FTA (Fault 
Tree Analysis) and ETA (Event Tree Analysis) methods? 
3. How did the consequences modelling outcome using Process Hazard 
Analysis Software Tools? 
4. How to formulate the risk outcome using Company Risk Matrix? 
5. What needs to be evaluate in firefighting equipment based on 
consequences modelling outcome? 
6. What are the mitigation if the facility are not comply to overcome certain 
event? 
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1.3.  Problem Limitations 
The problem limitation of this thesis are: 
1. This thesis scope is at entire section of the Terminal’s facility including 
receiving, storage, and distribution facility but not consider the potential 
loss outside Terminal surrounding. 
2. Consequences analysis of this research only based on iginited hazard. 
3. The quantity of LPG in storage are considered at its maximum amount 
(2500 MT). 
4. The system work are considerd in its maximum capacity. 
5. The representation of severity only assess the indiviual losses and not 
assess through operational losses point of view. 
. 
1.4.  Research Objectives 
1. Identify the potential hazard using Hazard and Operability Assesment. 
2. After the potential hazard identified, the process is necessary to describe 
systems failure frequencies using Fault Tree Analysis and Event Tree 
Analysis. 
3. The probable consequences based on event which has been determined 
have to be calculated using Process Hazard Analysis Software Tools. 
4. To examine whether the possible risk are acceptable or not using 
company risk profile formulation. 
5. To assess the pre fire planning as further mitigation 
6. To conclude the Pre Fire Planning to overcome the possible action to take 
in certain occurence. 
 
1.5.  Research Benefits 
As the process of assessment in this thesis are involving various and 
sequential Quantitative Risk Assessment methods each method is giving Terminal 
LPG Semarang greater improvement in their safety aspect. The hazard 
identification process in this thesis is giving Terminal LPG Semarang major 
depiction in their LPG handling system which aspects and components may lead 
into posible hazard in operational prpocess.  
The Frequency Analysis in this thesis are giving Terminal LPG Semarang 
detailed calculation of the failure frequency and probability of their 
commponents in LPG handling systems. The quantitive result on this assessment 
stage are giving Terminal LPG Semarang the chance to determine its risk based 
ranking by the quantitative result. 
Consequences evaluation on the consequences modelling stage are conduct 
better understanding for Terminal LPG Semarang the physical effect of certain 
event or occurence into Terminal LPG Semarang surrounding area and how much 
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the consequences will impact the societal aspect and the effect of certain event 
that can lead into another or escalated effect that may occur. 
The pre fire planning evaluation gives brief depiction of the possibility that 
Terminal LPG Semarang firefighting equipment cannot get over certain effect. 
The deviation occurs in this analysis further will be recomend Terminal LPG 
Semarang to evaluate its firefighting facility.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE STUDY 
 
2.1.  Recent Conditions 
Terminal LPG Semarang as one of vital facility in LPG supply chain especially 
in Central Java region is one of gas facility that required to have absolute and 
strict regulation in safety standard including a planning of action to be taken 
when an accident occurred. Regarding of those requirement Terminal LPG 
Semarang is prosecuted to have a detailed procedure such as Fire Risk 
Assessment. The Fire Risk Assessment later will be a platform to examine pre fire 
planning. Pre fire planning is an method to plan such as action to overcome 
specific accident that may occur due to specific condition when the event of 
accident occur, in this case the pre fire planning is due to fire event. 
The things that considered in pre fire planning are mostly the action that have 
to be taken when the fire event occur. Other things that consist in pre fire plan is 
the analysis of firefighting equipment such as sprinkle, fire hose, etc. to calculate 
the need of the firefighting equipment the calculation are based on the NFPA 
(National Fire Protection Agency) standard. 
The effect of unavailability of the pre fire plan can be catastrophic. The 
escalation of the effect is can be increasing due to lack of action. The action has 
to be correct information and in details. Also the good action are has to be 
synchronize with good firefighting equipment planning. 
The platform to plan and analysis whether the firefighting equipment or 
firefighting action is taken from the calculation and modelling how big the 
accident may occur based on specific condition that affect how catastrophic the 
event will. This can be done by certain method using consequences modelling 
with the correct and specific approach. 
 
2.2.  Previous Research 
2.2.1.   Hazard Potency Analysis Of LPG Loading Process In Terminal 
LPG Semarang 
The previous research regarding hazard potency in unloading process of LPG 
in Terminal LPG Semarang has been done by Bawono Rizki Putra. The research 
are analyze variuos hazard that may occur during unoading process from Ship 
into shore storage facility. To reduce any hazard possibility, some methods could 
be used. Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) is a proper method to be used to 
analyze any hazard probability, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Layer of Protection 
(LOPA) shall be used too to analyze the failure rate and the mitigation if the risk 
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level is in medium or higher level. All LPG loading system should be analyzed to 
guarantee that the system would not cause small or big accident (Putra, 2016). 
All LPG loading system should be analyzed to guarantee that the system 
would not cause small or big accident. An LPG loading system is a system that 
load propane and butane from the carrier vessel to the tank in the LPG plant. The 
system that have been analyzed then must be categorized based on it risk level, 
a low or moderate risk level shall not be mitigated while a medium or higher risk 
level shall be mitigated, the risk level itself was based on the risk matrix, this risk 
matrix had it definition to determine the probability and severity level, when the 
severity and probability number was combined, a risk level could be determined, 
which means risk level is a combination of severity and probability of a system or 
sub-system. The mitigation process shall reduce the risk xii level of the LPG 
loading process. 
This research resulted in a decission that all the hazard are in allowed level so 
thet significant mitigatioin plant are not necessarily conducted. 
 
2.2.2.   Pre Fire Planning Assessment Of Depot LPG Cilacap. 
On Thursday at 22 March 2012 at 10.00 PM on Cilacap LPG Terminal storage 
tank F which contains mixed LPG which ongoing LPG supply operations into 
corresponding tank from RU IV T-105 tank. Suddenly the fire spark is occur on 
the roof side of the tank, and the tank is also suffer a leakage on pressure release 
valve causing a fire on relief valve. The fire was first saw by one of the employee 
and immediately reported into tank security officer. 
The consequences modelling of this case are using software called ARCHIE to 
determine the effect of the event. The result of the modelling later become the 
baseline to evaluate the existing firefighting equipment in Depot LPG Cilacap. The 
result of the assessment concluding that certain firefighting facility are not 
comply with the minimum requirement based on NFPA (National Fire Protection 
Agency). The recommendation of this paper are to evaluate the facility to 
overcome the event in the future based on recent accident that happened 
(Pertmina HSSE Jawa Tengah, 2012). 
 
2.3.  Theories 
2.3.1.  Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) or in Indonesia so called ELPIJI is a major fuel 
to support Indonesia’s household needs as cooking fuel. LPG contains 2 (two) 
main components of Hydrocarbons gases which are Propane (C3H8) and Butane 
(C4H10). In Indonesia LPG for cooking purpose is mixture LPG with 50:50 ratio 
between Butane and Propane. As the complete specification of mixed LPG has 
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been determine by Indonesia’s Ministry of Natural Resources (ESDM) can be seen 
in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1 Mixed LPG Specification (Kementrian ESDM, 2010) 
NO. CHARACTERISTIC UNIT LIMIT TEST METHODS 
MINIMUM MAXIMUM ASTM OTHERS 
1. Relative Density at 
60oF 
- To be reported D-
1657 
- 
2. Vapor Pressure at 
100oF 
Psig - 145 D-
1267 
- 
3. Weathering Test 
at 30oF 
%vol 95 - D-
1837 
- 
4 Copper Bar 
Corrosion 
1 
Hour/1000F 
- ASTM No. 
1 
D-
1838 
- 
5. Total Sulphur 
Content 
Grains/100 
cuff 
- 15 D-
2764 
- 
6. Water content - No. Free water - Visual 
7. Composition 
C2 
C3 and C4 
C5+ (and heavier) 
 
%vol 
%vol 
%vol 
 
- 
97,5 
- 
 
0,8 
- 
2,0 
D-
2153 
- 
8. Ethyl Or Butyl 
Mercaptan 
ml/100AG 50 - - 
 
LPG in Indonesia mainly supplied by importing from another country and 
carried into floating storage in Teluk Semangka for Western Indonesia region and 
Kalbut for Eastern Indonesia region, then transferred into main receiving terminal 
accross Indonesia using Gas Carrier Ship as seen in Figure 2.1. From inland main 
terminal then carried by skid tank or truck with gas tank into bottling station or 
known as SPBE (Stasiun Pengisian Bahan Bakar Elpiji) accross the country before 
its distributed in botlled gas in various capacity such as 3 kg, 12 kg, and 50 kg. 
Since the type of LPG being used in Indonesia is mixture LPG, during carriage 
by the ship the Propane and Butane are carried separately. And during unloading 
process will be mixing process in shore storage tank, and also will be an 
mercaptan injection as odor agent for LPG. 
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Figure 2.1 Gas Carrier Ship Unloading Process 
 
2.3.2.  Hazard And Operability (HAZOP) Assessment 
HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) is one of technique to analyze the potential 
hazard in specific system with the intention of knowing the cause from the 
guidewords that lead the analysis into what kind of consequences that may occur. 
This technique is a development from critical examination. It is a team exercise, 
which involves examining the design intent in the light of guidewords. The 
technique has itself been subject to numerous variations (Mannan, 2005). 
The basic concept of the HAZOP study is to take a full description of the 
process and to question every part of it to discover what deviations from the 
intention of the design can occur and what the causes and consequences of these 
deviations might be. This is done systematically by applying suitable guidewords. 
Thus important features of the study are: 
1. design intent 
2. deviations 
3. causes of deviations 
4. consequences 
5. hazards 
6. Operating difficulties. (Mannan, 2005) 
The technical process of HAZOP assessment is to list the critical coponents 
that lead into potential hazard and what kind of guide words to lead into the 
deviations as seen in Table 2.2 is the typical british standard form that will be 
used in this thesis. 
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Table 2.2 Example of HAZOP Assessment (British Standard, 2001) 
 
 
2.3.3.  Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Assessment 
 
 
Figure 2.2 FTA Applications 
 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a method to determining cause of specific top 
event incident that caused by several basics cause, using logical graphic depiction 
that called Bolean Logic Gate. The fault tree is a graphical model that displays the 
various combinations of equipment failures and human errors that can result in 
the main system failure of interest (called the Top event). The purpose of an FTA 
is to identify combinations of equipment failures and human errors that can result 
in an accident. FTA is well suited for analyses of highly redundant systems 
(American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1992). The example of FTA basic 
application as seen in Figure 2.2. 
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2.3.4.  Event Tree Analysis (ETA) Assessment 
Event Tree Analysis is a method to predict the posible outcomes by showing 
it into graphs that show the probability of various scenarios and the 
consequences. The results of the Event Tree Analysis are accident sequences; that 
is, sets of failures or errors that lead to an accident. These results describe the 
possible accident outcomes in terms of the sequence of events (successes or 
failures of safety functions) that follow an initiating event (American Institute of 
Chemical Engineers, 1992). 
As seen in Figure 2.3 show the typical LPG handing Event Tree Analysis result. 
The results of an Event Tree Analysis are the event tree models and the safety 
system successes or failures that lead to each defined outcome. Accident 
sequences depicted in an event tree represent logical and combinations of 
events; thus, these sequences can be put into the form of a fault tree model for 
further qualitative analysis (American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1992). 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Typical ETA for LPG Handling (Selvan, 2015) 
 
2.3.5.  Consequences Modelling Using Process Hazard Analysis 
Software Tools  
Consequences modelling is one of the method to numerical and 
computational based modelling to predict what an accident can affect and what 
its physical outcome to the surrounding, and also show what its potential impact 
to people, assets or safety function. 
There are several approaching method to do consequences modelling they 
are: release approach, dispersion in air and water approach, fire and thermal 
radiation, explosion approach, smoke and gas ingress approach, and toxicity 
approach. All the approaches are making consequences modelling has a lot of 
aspect to explore, but also for the same reason the various approach that exist 
make it are quite hard to cover all the approach in one hit. It makes the tools (e.g. 
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Software) to do an approach is have their own boundaries/limits to calculation. 
For example for certain software which concerning about thermal and radiation 
approach are cannot to be used in smoke or toxicity approach. This limitation 
make the approach to overcome an event are have to be specifically determined 
and chosen to do such an analysis. 
Process Hazard Analysis Software Tools is one of most comprehensive hazard 
analysis software for all stages including process industry, design, and operation 
will be very comply with the problem above, since Process Hazard Analysis 
Software Tools is can analyze the present potential hazard that may occur 
accurately and also provide clear illustration of the outcomes that may results 
from the modelling process. Process Hazard Analysis Software Tools is also in 
compliance with the safety regulations that is strictly monitored in oil and gas 
industry. The result is as shown in Figure 2.4 the modelling gives clear visual 
outcome that show the affected areas and the physical outcome such as heat 
flux. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Process Hazard Analysis Software Tools Modelling Result (DNV GL, 2015) 
 
2.3.6.  Consequences Evaluation: Fire, Release, Explosion, and 
Dispersion 
The main scenario of accident that may occur in a process industry are consist 
four scenarios, which are: Fire, Release, Explosion, and Dispersion. Every scenario 
has their own affect and effect and their severity are also different as seen in Table 
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2.3. The hazardous event that may appear also differ based on what kind of 
material and what kind of process involved. 
 
Table 2.3 Event Scenario for Flammable Material (Mannan, 2005) 
Material State Storage Hazardous Event 
Flamable Liquids Atmospheric Liquid Release, then Tank or bund fire 
Tank Explosion, then Tank or bund fire 
 Liquefied 
Gas 
Pressure Flashing liquid release –flamable vapour cloud, 
liquid pool, then 
Pool fire 
Running liquid fire 
Jet Fire 
Vapour cloud fire 
Vapour cloud explosion 
Fire engulfed fire, then 
Jet fire 
BLEVE 
 Liquefied 
Gas 
Refigerated Flashing liquid release –flamable vapour cloud, 
liquid pool, then 
Tank or bund pool fire 
Running liquid fire 
Vapour cloud fire 
Vapour cloud explosion 
Fire engulfed tank, then 
Tank or bund pool fire 
Running fire 
 
2.3.6.1.  Jet Fire 
Basically Jet Fire is an event when certain material or gases release followed 
by ignition of the material. This caused spray fire which is turbulent diffusion 
flame resulting from the combustion of a fuel continuously released with some 
significant momentum in a particular direction or directions as seen in Figure 2.5. 
Jet fires can arise from releases of gaseous, flashing liquid (two phase) and pure 
liquid inventories (Cowley, 1992). 
There are a lot of aspect that that make jet fire is become harmful such as: 
1. Flame extent and geometry. 
2. Ignitability, stability, and lift off. 
3. Radiation to surrounding. 
4. Directional stability. 
5. Properties of combustion products (eg. Smoke, gases, liquids) 
6. Heat fluxes. 
7. Turbulence level and aerodynaics forces into fire. 
8. And temporal variations of aspect above. (Cowley, 1992) 
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Figure 2.5 Jet Fire (Kontrol, 2013) 
 
2.3.6.2.  Vapour Cloud Fire 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Vapour Cloud Fire (Royal Society, 2012) 
 
A vapor cloud fire, or flash fire, occurs when a vapor cloud forms from a leak 
and is ignited, but without creation of significant overpressure. If such 
overpressure occurs, the event is a vapor cloud explosion (VCE) rather than a 
vapor cloud fire (VCF) (Mannan, 2005). 
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Cloud Fires are transient event resulting from the ignition of a cloud of gas 
vapour and not subject to significant flame acceleration via the effect of 
confinment or turbulence (Cowley, 1992). 
As can be seen in Figure 2.6 the example of cloud fire which an massive fire 
that create such as “cloud-like” form. 
 
2.3.6.3.  Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) 
BLEVE is simply explosively expanding vapor or two-phase fluid. A BLEVE 
results from a “hot rupture” of a vessel typically containing hydrocarbons such as 
LPG3, stored and maintained as a liquid under pressure, due to an impinging or 
engulfing fire. A flammable material will be ignited immediately upon rupture by 
the impinging/engulfing fire and will burn as a fireball (International Associations 
of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP), 2010). 
 
2.4.  Standards 
2.4.1.  British Standard IEC 61882:2001 Hazard And Operabilities 
(HAZOP) Studies Applications Guide 
As on methods on this assessment is to determine the potential hazard 
using Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study one of the concern is determining 
the sguidance so tht during the process of hazard identification is going 
objective. 
British Standard as one of major standarization organization has provide a 
guideline to do HAZOP assesment. This is providing the method to be 
standarize as one complete schematic stage that must be follow with the object 
of: 
 Identifying potential hazards in the system. The hazards involved may 
include both those essentially relevant only to the immediate area of the 
system and those with a much wider sphere of influence, e.g. some 
environmental hazards; 
 Identifying potential operability problems with the system and in 
particular identifying causes of operational disturbances and production 
deviations likely to lead to nonconforming products (British Standard, 
2001). 
Using British Standard the HAZOP studies follow several sequential step as 
shown in Figure 2.7. 
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Definition
 Define scope and objectives
 Define responsibility
 Select team
Preparation
 Plan the study
 Collect data
 Agree style of recording
 Estimate the time
 Arrange a schedule
Examination
 Divide system into parts
 Select a part and define design intent
 Identify deviation bu using guide words on each elements
 Identify consequences and causes
 Identify whether a significant problem exist
 Identify protection, detection, and indicating mechanism
 Identify possible remedial/mitigating measures (optional)
 Agree actions
 Report for each element and then each part of the system
Documentation and follow up
 Record the examination
 Sign off the documentation
 Produce the report of the study
 Follow up that actions are implemented
 Re-study any parts of system if necessary
 Produce final output report
 
Figure 2.7 British Standard for HAZOP Studies (British Standard, 2001) 
 
2.4.2.  DNV Failure Frequency Guidance 
DNV as one of safety Assessor is providing data of failure or leak event from 
various source of process industry; DNV’s data is derived from the Hydrocarbon 
Release Database (HCRD) which has been compiled by the UK Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) over a 20 year period The database contains details of over 4000 
leak events at oil and gas installations in the UK Continental Shelf. It identifies 78 
different types and size categories of process equipment, and records the 
quantity of the release and the release holes size (DNV, 2014). This data then 
proceed and analyze so that become an frequency analysis as shown in Table 
2.4.and being used for various risk assessment in process industry. 
The failure frequency usage is based on consideration on what kind of 
components that being used and its dimension. The spesifically identification of 
type of components and dimension makes for certain case it is not listed on the 
failure frequency datasheet. It makes the usage of different data source are 
needed for determine the failure frequency. The other source for external data 
usage on this research is using OGP Failure frequency datasheet. 
18 
 
 
 
Table 2.4 DNV Failure Frequencies (DNV, 2014) 
 
2.4.3.  International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP) 
Storage Incident Frequencies 
From various hydrocarbon containtment system around the world which 
becomes OGP’s research object, OGP conduct datasheet about the failure or 
incident frequencies per years that can be use as an baseline for determining our 
failure frequencies of hydrocarbons containtment systems. The datasheet 
presents frequencies of releases from the following types of storage: 
1. Atmospheric storage 
2. Refrigerated storage 
3. Pressurized storage 
4. Oil storage on FPSOs 
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5. Non-process Hydrocarbon Storage Offshore 
6. Underground storage (International Association of Oil and Gas 
Producers (OGP) , 2010). 
The complete table of pressurised storage cann be seen on Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.5 Pressurised Storage Failure Frequancies (International Association of Oil and 
Gas Producers (OGP) , 2010) 
Hole Diameter Leak Frequency (per vessel year) 
Range (mm) Nominal (mm) Storage Vessel Small Containers 
1-3 2 2,3 x 10 -5 4,4 x 10 -7 
3-10 5 1,2 x 10 -5 4,6 x 10 -7 
10-50 25 7,1 x 10 -6  
50-150 100 4,3 x 10 -6  
>150 Catastrophic 4,7 x 10 -7 1,0 x 10 -7 
Total  4,7 x 10 -5 1,0 x 10 -6 
 
2.4.4.  International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP) 
Ignition Probability 
In the process of gas leakage or release there are probability the released gas 
to be ignited so that its no longer release or dispersion, its become fire. OGP has 
conduct a research that identified the connection between released gases and its 
probability to be ignited. Development of the research deliver datasheets that 
can be use to predict the probability of ignited gas release. The complete 
datasheet table for specific scenarios in this thesis can be seen on Table 2.6. 
 
Table 2.6 OGP Ignition Probability (Oil and Gas Producers, 2013) 
Large Plant Gas LPG 
Release of flamable gases, vapour or liquids 
significantly above their normal (NAP) boiling point 
from large onshore outdors plants. 
Release Rate (kg/s) Ignition Probability 
0,1 0,0010 
0,2 0,0014 
0,5 0,0019 
1 0,0025 
2 0,0050 
Continued to next table 
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5 0,0125 
10 0,0250 
20 0,0500 
50 0,1250 
100 0,2500 
200 0,5000 
500 0,6500 
1000 0,6500 
 
2.4.5.  NFPA 15 Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire 
Protection 
 
Table 2.7 Requirement for Flow Rate (NFPA, 2007) 
Pipe Size Flow 
In. mm gpm L/min 
4 100 300 1.476 
6 150 880 3.331 
8 200 1.560 5.905 
10 250 2.440 9.235 
12 300 3.520 13.323 
 
As the evaluation of fire protection system in Terminal LPG Semarang there 
should be an standar as an standard and guideline. This will determine whether 
the facility in Terminal LPG Semarang are comply with certain regulation and can 
overcome certain fire incident. For example as shown in Table 2.7. there are 
minimum flow rate for water spray supply. 
This standard provides the minimum requirements for the design, installation, 
and system acceptance testing of water spray fixed systems for fire protection 
service and the minimum requirements for the periodic testing and maintenance 
of ultra-high-speed water spray fixed systems (NFPA, 2007). 
Continued from previous table 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1.  Methodology Flowchart 
 
Start
Statement of the 
problem
Literature Study
Data Collection
1. Terminal Layout and 
P&ID
2. Terminal Facility
3. Terminal Ambient 
Paramaters
4. Release Frequecies
5. LPG PropertiesHazard and 
Operability (HAZOP) 
Analysis 
Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA)
Event Tree Analysis 
(ETA)
1. Recent Conditions
2. Theories
4. Standards
    -BS IEC 61882:2001
    -DNV Leak Frequencies
    -NFPA 15
Consequences Modelling 
Using Process Hazard 
Analysis Software Tools
1. Event Occurance
2. Ambient Paramater
Pre Fire Planning
Does System Comply 
The Requirement ?
Recommendation
Yes
No
Conclussion
Evaluation
End
Risk Mapping
Company Risk 
Matrix
NFPA 15
API 2510
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3.2.  Research Methodology 
Research methododlogy is the proposed solution methods to solve the 
problem at one specific research. On this thesis the main framework for solving 
the problem are consist of 4 (four) stage, which are: hazard identification, 
frequency analysis using fault tree and event tree analysis, consequences 
modelling, and pre fire planning evaluation. The complete stage of this thesis 
methodology will be explained further below. 
1. Statement of the problem 
First to identify the problem to determine what kind of 
formulation and methods to be taken. This is the initial stage to start the 
research. The amount of problem and the limitation are things to be 
considered during this stage, and in the middle of the research there are 
might be correction depend on the course of the research. 
2. Literature Study 
There are a lot of reference to do a research. On this stage all the 
reference during this thesis work will be reviewed. This including the basic 
theories that come from various literature source, recent condition, and 
standard including: BS IEC 61882:2001, DNV Leak Frequencies, NFPA 15. 
And also various previous resaerach on risk assessment that may useful 
to this thesis. 
3. Collection of Data 
One of the main stage of this research are to be modelling the 
consequences of accident that may occur and its effect. The modelling 
process is need various data to be considered an as close as actual 
condition in operation process. This data collection have very big 
influence further in analytical process so the validity of data are the things 
that need to be considered very carefully.  
Kind of data that need to be collected in this research are such as: 
Terminal Layout and P&ID, Terminal facility, Terminal operation data, 
Terminal ambient parameters, Release frequencies, LPG Properties. 
4. Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Analysis 
Potential cause of failure describes how a process failure could 
occur, in terms of something that can be controlled or corrected. The goal 
is to describe the  direct relationship that exists between the cause and 
resulting process failure mode. The major steps to do HAZOP assessment 
are: 1. Preparing for the review, 2. Performing the review, and 3. 
Documenting the results. (American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 
1992) 
5. Fault Tree Analysis Assessment 
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Based on previous HAZOP assessment the FTA determine the 
probability of failure event that may occur. There are four steps an analyst 
must take to perform a Fault Tree Analysis: 1. defining the problem, 2. 
constructing the fault tree, 3. analyzing the fault tree model qualitatively, 
and 4. documenting the results (American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 
1992). 
6. Event Tree Analysis 
Event Tree Analysis evaluates the potential for an accident that is 
the result of a general type of equipment failure or process upset (known 
as an initiating event. The general procedure for Event Tree Analysis 
contains six steps: 1. identifying the initiating events of interest that can 
result in the type of accident of concern, 2. identifying the safety functions 
designed to mitigate the initiating event, 3. constructing the event tree, 4. 
describing the resulting accident sequence outcomes, 5. determining the 
accident sequence minimal cut sets, and 6. documenting the results. 
7. Consequences Modelling 
From the event which already predicted using ETA the actual 
consequences will be modelling using Process Hazard Analysis Software 
Tools. This will give clear visual representation how the consequences will 
affect, and the effect of the occurence. 
8. Risk Representation 
From the analysis the posible risk outcome will be determined for 
each scenarios. Every possible occurence will be represented into 
company based risk evaluation whether the outcomes are acceptable (low 
risk) or not. The desired result are the majority scenarios will be not in 
high risk level area. But if theres any medium or high risk outcome there 
will be mitigation efforts. The risk mapping in this thesis will be using 
company risk matrix where the company already determine by themself 
which grouping certain risk by it’s severity and occurence likelihood. 
9. Pre Fire Planning Evaluation 
The modelling give result that can be a baseline to evaluate the 
terminal facility whether the consequences that may be occur can be 
overcome by terminal facility. This resulting as pre fire planning which this 
stage when pre fire planning will be made. The standard thet will be used 
is NFPA 15. If there’s found incompliance the process will prosecuted into 
evaluation of terminal facility. 
10. Result and Discussion 
This stage are summarize the analytical stage and evaluation 
stage, and also considering certain deviation that may occur. 
11. Conclusion 
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At this stage all the research process and result will be conclude 
and as validation of this research is this answering the problem or not. 
And the end result is to be suggested and recommend the terminal LPG 
Semarang as its evaluation tools. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA REQUIREMENT 
 
4.1.  General Description 
This thesis analyze potential fire risk and pre fire planning to overcome the 
fire occurrence that may occur based on the risk evaluation using quantitative 
risk assessment, with Terminal LPG Semarang as an object to assess. The scope 
of the assessment are in entire system on the terminal which handling the LPG 
including receiving (from tanker ship), storage, and distribution process.  
 
4.2.  Data Requirement 
In the assessment process there are required several data to support the 
assessment process, the required data on this thesis are: 
 
4.2.1.  Terminal Plant Layout 
The terminal layout are required to give the depiction of the area to be assess 
and further the layout also needed to plot the consequences evaluation. The brief 
layout of Terminal LPG Semarang can be seen on Figure 4.1. The lyout of Terminal 
LPG Semarang shows the coverage area of entire Terminal. The Jetty which 
exceed 1.200 m consist of the Jetty area of Marine Loading arm, Trestle area, and 
the pipeline exceed into partial part of shoreline. The Terminal area consist of 
Tank Farm, office, filling shed, pumphouse and skid tank parking area. The more 
detailed layout can be seen on Appendix 1. 
 
4.2.2.  Systems Piping and Instrumental (P&ID) Diagrams 
To find certain possible hazard on the systems the analysis is involving to 
analyze how the systems works and during operational what are the possible 
failure that can lead into hazard. To do that it required the complete schematic 
P&ID of the systems and its components so it can be analyze. Considering in this 
thesis will be assess entire terminal system from receiving (from tanker ship), 
storage, and distribution the complete the following P&ID are: 
1. LPG Ship Loading and Unloading P&ID 
2. LPG Loading Storage Tank P&ID (consist 2 sheets of documents) 
3. LPG Loading Pumps and Filling Points P&ID (consist 3 sheets of 
documents) 
4. Fire Water Distribution System P&ID. 
The further and more detailed diagrams can be seen on Appendix 2. 
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Figure 4.1 Layout of Terminal LPG Semarang 
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4.2.3.  Company Risk Matrix 
The risk mapping process require the standard to determine the level of risk. 
To fulfill the process this thesis will be using company risk matrix as standard 
(Terminal LPG Semarang, 2013). The risk matrix consist of two axis which 
determine the likelihood and the severity of certain risk. The ranking of each 
aspect then otted into matrix then the resul will be determine as the risk level. 
The description of likelihood and severity  can be seen on Table 4.2. and 4.3. The 
risk matrix can be seen on Figure 4.4. 
 
Table 4.2 Company Risk Likelihood Descriptions (Terminal LPG Semarang, 2013) 
Likelihood 
Level Criteria 
Description 
Qualitative Quantitative 
1 Rare Considered but not only in 
extreme condition. 
Less than 1 time in 10 years. 
2 Unlikely  Not happen yet but can be 
occur sometimes 
1 times in 10 years. 
3 Possible Supposed to be occur here / in 
other places. 
1 time in 5 years until 1 time a 
year.  
4 Likely  Easily occur, might occur in a 
more likely way.  
More than 1 time a year until 1 
time a month. 
5 Almost 
certain 
Often occur and appear in a 
often occurence.  
More than 1 times a month.  
 
 
Table 4.3 Company Risk Severity Descriptions (Terminal LPG Semarang, 2013) 
Consequences / Severity 
Level Description Severity Workdays 
1 Not 
significant  
Occurence does not caused loss or 
injury.  
Not causing loss of 
workdays  
2 Minimal Causing minor injury and no direct 
effect into business activity. 
Still can work on 
the same day / 
shift.  
3 Moderate Major injury and hospitalized but not 
causing permanent disability, and 
moderate financial loss. 
Loss of workdays 
under 3 days. 
4 Major Major injury and permanent disability 
and major financial loss and seriously 
damage business activity. 
Loss of workdays 
more than 3 days. 
5 Catastrophic Serious causality (die) and stopping 
business activity forever 
Loss of workdays 
forever. 
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4.2.4.  Terminal Fire Fighting Arrangement and Components 
The arrangement are required to assess whether the firefighting facility can 
overcome the possible outcome. The terminal Fire Fighting can be seen on Figure 
4.3. The terminal Fire Fighting facility also can be seen on Table 4.1, and the 
complete equipment list can be seen on Appendix 3.  
 
Table 4.1 Fire Fighting Equipment (Terminal LPG Semarang, 2013) 
Fire Fighting Equipment              
  Quantity Amount Brand Type  Engine Mover 
Fixed Fire Pump 
cap   @3000 GPM  
  
  
Unit(s) 4 Amarillo Vertical Clarke Diesel  
Amarillo Vertical Clarke Diesel  
Amarillo Vertical Clarke Diesel  
Amarillo Vertical Clarke Diesel  
Jockey Pump 
Cap. 13.51 GPM 
Unit(s) 2 Grunfos Vertical - Electric 
Mufitec Vertical - Electric 
Fixed Fire Pump Jetty Area  
Cap  1000 GPM 
Unit(s) 1 Amarillo Vertical Clarke Diesel  
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As a primary system to overcome fire evnent in the Terminal are using 
fresh water as an estinguisher the firefighting system in Terminal LPG Semarang 
are mainly consist of fixed water spray or sprinkle and fire hose. All the main 
estinguisher are provided with water from water pond using main fire pump 
which use diesel as a prime mover. The water pond get its water from external 
resource so that the design intent of the fire fighting system are closed loop so 
that no external resources (such as sea water coming from the sea which surround 
the Terminal) are intentionally come in handy when in condition of the water 
pond is out of water. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Terminal Fire Fighting Arrangement 
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CHAPTER 5 
TERMINAL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
 
5.1.  General Description 
Terminal LPG Semarang consist 3 (three) main subsystem on its facility. The 
first are receiving subsystem that conduct receiving operation of bulk LPG from 
Gas Carrier Ship the second subsystem is storage of LPG in storage tank. The last 
subsystems are distribution system that responsible in transferring the LPG from 
storage tank into filling station related with the transfer process into Skid Tank 
(Truck equipped with tank) for transportation into the destination.  
 
5.2.  Receiving System 
During receiving operations of bulk LPG from ship, the LPG are transfered 
using pump onboard ship. The preliminary step of the transfer process are 
including the connection of Terminal’s Marine Loading Arm (MLA) into ship’s 
manifold. 
The major components to be considered in Receiving subsyetem are Marine 
Loading Arm (MLA) as seen on Figure 5.1 which connect the shore with ship’s 
manifold. Materring station as shore measurement components to calculate the 
amount and flow rate of the LPG. And Mercaptan injection station as component 
with the purpose of odorizing the LPG. Another components to be considered 
are main pipeline, various valve such as Shutdown Valve (SDV). Control Valve 
(CV), erc. Also various measuring components such as: Temperature Indicator (TI), 
Pressure Indicator (PI), etc. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Marine Loading Arm  
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This system are using 10” pipeline as a main pipe, the complete components 
specification of this system are: 
 Marine Loading Arm 
 Producer: Woodfield Systems Limited 
 Equipment Type: Hydraulic Lever 
 Model Number: A2/08/1200/600/008 
 Manufacturing year: 2008 
 Flow/Pressure: 4 LMP/13,6 BarG 
 Ship Unloading Meterring Package 
 Max. Flow Rate : 300 MT/Hr 
 Operational Press : 7-14 BarG 
 Operational Temp. : 5-30oC  
Vapour Return Meterring Package 
 Max. Flow Rate : 8 MT/Hr 
 Operational Press : 7-14 BarG 
 Operational Temp. : 5-30oC  
The process of loading LPG into shore storage tank beside the liquid LPG 
loading are also involve with unloading the LPG vapour back into Gas Carrier 
Ship. The process make the receiving process also invlove two different flow of 
fluids: the liquid LPG flow into storage tank, and Vapour LPG from storage tank 
into Gas Carrier Ship which using 4” pipelines. The complete system P7ID can be 
seen on Appendix 2. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Meterring Station  
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5.3.  Storage Tank System 
The next system is storage tank system, storage tank are the end point of 
transferring LPG from Gas Carrier after injected by Mercaptan. The Storage Tank 
type are Spherical type storage as seen on Figure 5.3. As main system of handling 
that involve a lot amont of LPG the storage tank are equipped with various 
safeguard and measurement and instrumentation of LPG Cpndition such as: 
Atomatic Tank Gauging (ATG), Pressure Safety Valve (PSV), Pressure Indicator (PI), 
Temperature Indicator (TI), etc. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Spherical Storage Tank 
 
The operational activity on storage tank subsystem are consists of receiving 
activity, intertank activity, and distribution activity. The activity listed above are 
supported by various dimension of pipeline. The pipeline for receiving and 
intertank activity are using 10” pipelines, the distribution activity are using 12” 
pipelines. Meanwhile the vapour return line are using 4” pipelines.  
The techinical specification for Storage Tank are:  
 Size   : 21216 mm 
 Capacity  : 2500 MT 
 Operation Press. : 7-14 BarG 
 Operating Temp : 5-30oC 
 Manufacturer  : Shi-Asia Company LTD 
 Design Pressure : 17,2 BarG at 700C 
 Test Pressure  : 21,93 kg/cm2 (Top of vessel) 
 Min. Metal Design 
Temp.   : Minus 100C 
 Year built  : 2009 
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5.4.  Distribution Subsystem 
Distribution system are responsible for distribute the LPG into filling point as 
well as do intertank operation. The distribution system are consist of 4 (four) LPG 
Pumps, and that supply activity in filling point into Skid Tank using Quick 
Coupling Connection. The operation of 4 (Four) LPG pumps are redundant 
considering the operation cycle requested by distribution division so that the 
redundant system are designed the distribution are still can fulfill the need when 
something happend with one of the pump. Also in the system is consist of one 
unloading pump from skid tank in a case when overfilling is happend into Skid 
Tank. In normal distribution activity usually 2 (two) LPG pumps are used. 
The distribution process from storage tanle into pumps suction head are 
using 12” pipelines, and reduced into 6” pipelines so do with the pipelines in 
filling point. Meanwhile the filling process into skid tank are using various size of 
pipelines depends on the intent of the operational. 
The technical specification for distribution subsystem are: 
 LPG Pumps 
 Type   : Centrifugal Pump 
 Flow rate  : 30 MT/hr max 50 MT/hr 
 Max. Press.  : 17,24 BarG 
 Rated Discharge  
Press.   : 205,65 psi ~ 13, 99 BarG 
 
 
Figure 5.4 LPG Pumps  
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CHAPTER 6 
HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) STUDY 
 
Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study giving the detailed assessment of the 
potential hazard which may occur. The basis of HAZOP is a “guide word 
examination” which is a deliberate search for deviations from the design intent 
(British Standard, 2001). The basic concept of the HAZOP study is to take a full 
description of the process and to question every part of it to discover what 
deviations from the intention of the design can occur and what the causes and 
consequences of these deviations might be. Based on BS IEC 61882:2001 the 
process of HAZOP study are include in determining the nodes, deviations, 
safeguards, and another criteria to support the study. 
 
6.1.  Node Classification 
The LPG handling facility consists of various system that divided into main 
division: Receiving (from Gas Carrier), Storage, and Distribution. The complete 
system of the Terminal as P&ID can be seen in Appendix 2. The main division still 
consist of several subsystem that support the Terminal Activity based on P&ID 
classification eventhough certain process need to be separeted due to different 
flow direction and different operational intent. The node classification is ease us 
to assess the HAZOP study since every subsystem are consist of various 
components and also different operational intent. The complete node 
classifications can be seen on Table 5.1. above. 
 
The technical description of the node classification above are: 
1. Node 1 
This Node are concerned in liquid loading line from Gas Carrier into 
meterring station this system are divided based certain part in unloading 
system and Jetty Area. Considering the length of unloading line are 1.200 
m that divides into in Trestle area and shore area, every line need to be 
separate since the system has its own hazard potency based on its 
location. The part considered in this node are MLA (Marine Loading Arm) 
Liquid loading line, and pipeline located on trestle and causeway. The 
specification of liquid loading line of MLA are mentioned below: 
 Max. Flow Rate : 300 MT/Hr 
 Operational Press : 7-14 BarG 
 Operational Temp. : 5-30oC  
 
2. Node 2 
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The concern of this node are the system of liquid loading LPG from Gas 
Carrier into meterring station and located in shore area. Since this node 
are exposed into labour and open space rather than enclosed area like 
node 1. The part considered in this node are meterring station that show 
how much amount of Liquid LPG that transferred from Gas Carrier. 
 
3. Node 3 
The loading process of liquid LPG are followed by the unloading process 
of LPS vapour from storage tank into Gas Carrier. The reason why this line 
need to be separate into different node are because the flow direction 
and the type of fluids involved are different than loading line. The process 
of vapour return are only involving vapour phase of LPG rather than liquid 
phase. The consideration of this node to be determined are because this 
line are located in shore are of the Terminal. The part considered in this 
node is vapour return meterring station. 
 
4. Node 4 
This node is considered as the vapour return line at trestle or causeway 
area the pipeline are located in same location as node 1 but with different 
fluuids and flow direction works eventhough with the same part 
consideration such as MLA (Marine Loading Arm). 
 
5. Node 5 
This node classified storage tank subsystem that consist 4 (four) storage 
tank which are V110, V120, V130, and V140. This node are assess the 
possible hazard on storage in all operation intent into all storage tank. 
The operational specification of this node are: 
 Size   : 21216 mm 
 Amount of Storage : 4( four) 
 Capacity  : 2500 MT 
 Operation Press. : 7-14 BarG 
 Operating Temp : 5-30oC 
 
6. Node 6: Receiving Operation 
Apart from storage tank itself, the storage tank system have the pipelines 
that have to assess separately since the system has different components 
and different safeguard implementation comparing with the storage tank 
itself. The operational specification of this node are: 
 Pipe Size  : 10” Pipe, 4” Pipe (Vapour Return) 
 Flow Rate  : Max 300 MT/Hr, 8 MT/Hr (Vapour Return) 
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 Operation Press. : 7-14 BarG 
 Operating Temp : 5-30oC 
 
7. Node 6: Distribution Operation 
This process has the same design intent with Node 3: Receiving above but 
with differetnt operational intent, this node conduct assess in distribution 
operation. The operational specification of this node are: 
 Pipe Size  : 12” Pipe 
 Flow Rate  : 30 - 50 MT/Hr 
 Operation Press. : 7-14 BarG 
 Operating Temp : 5-30oC 
 
8. Node 6: Intertank Operation 
This process has the design intent with Node 3: Receiving with Intertank 
Operation. The operational specification of this node are: 
 Pipe Size  : 12” Pipe 
 Flow Rate  : 30 - 50 MT/Hr 
 Operation Press. : 7-14 BarG 
 Operating Temp : 5-30oC 
 
9. Node 7 
Node 4 is conduct assessment on LPG Pumps system. This pump provide 
the distribution into filling point. On this system consists of 4 (four) 
identical LPG Pumps with redundant operation. The technical 
specification of this node are: 
 Type   : Centrifugal Pump 
 Flow rate  : 30 MT/hr max 50 MT/hr 
 Max. Press.  : 17,24 BarG 
 Rated Discharge  
Press.   : 205,65 psi ~ 13, 99 BarG 
 
10. Node 8 
Node 5 are assess the filling point of LPG into Skid Tank. There are 6 (six) 
filling point into skid tank which operate simoltaneusly all of them that 
serviced by LPG Pumps. 
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Table 6.1 Node Classification 
No P&ID Drawing Code 
and Description 
Node Classification Description 
1 FTLS-30-DW-C006 
LPG Ship 
Loading/Unloading 
P&ID 
Node 1 Liquid loading MLA 
(Marine Loading Arm), 
Liquid loading line at 
trestle/jetty area 
2 FTLS-30-DW-C006 
LPG Ship 
Loading/Unloading 
P&ID 
Node 2 Liquid loading line at 
shore area and 
meterring station 
3 FTLS-30-DW-C006 
LPG Ship 
Loading/Unloading 
P&ID 
Node 3 Vapour return line 
located in shore area, 
and vapour return 
meterring station 
4 FTLS-30-DW-C006 
LPG Ship 
Loading/Unloading 
P&ID 
Node 4 Vapour return line 
located in trestle and 
jetty, Vapur return MLA 
(Marine Loading Line) 
5 FTLSMG-30-DW-C007 
LPG Loading Storage 
Tank V110, V120, V130, 
V140 P&ID 
Node 5 Storage Tank V110, 
V120, V130, V140 
6 FTLSMG-30-DW-C007 
LPG Storage System 
Pipelines 
Node 6: Receiving 
Operation 
Storage System 
Pipelines Receiving 
Operation 
Node 6: Distribution 
Operation 
Storage System 
Pipelines Distribution 
Operation 
Node 6: Intertank 
Operation 
Storage System 
Pipelines Intertank 
Operation 
7 FTLSMG-30-DW-C008 
LPG Loading Pumps  
Node 7 LPG loading pumps in 
Distribution Operation 
8 FTLSMG-30-DW-C008 
Filling Point P&ID 
Node 8 LPG Filling/Distribution 
into Skid Tank (LPG 
Tanker Truck)  
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6.2.  Systems Deviation Determination 
The Process of system deviation is to choose the guide word that comply with 
the desgn intent. Based on BS IEC 61882:2001 the list of the deviation are already 
provided as seen in Table 5.2. The guide word then combined with the type of 
deviation. The variables of the deviation can be determined based on the type of 
system that need to be asses. For the purpose of design and operational intent 
in this thesis are LPG handling the concerned are variables that can lead into rise 
of flow and temperature since that kind of deviation can lead into rupture of 
components and further caused the release of the LPG. 
 
Table 5.2 HAZOP Guide Word (British Standard, 2001) 
Guide Word Meaning 
NO OR NOT Complete negation of the design intent 
MORE Quintative increase 
LESS Quantitative decrease 
AS WELL AS Qualitative modification/increase 
PART OF Qualitative modification/decrease 
REVERSE Logical opposite of the design intent 
OTHER THAN Complete substitution 
 
6.3.  Causes and Consequences Determination 
The causes and consequences are variables that occur caused by the 
deviation implementation on the system. The detailed causes and consequences 
shall be determine so that the possible cause can be reduced and and the 
consequences can be mitigated. The operator and expertise point of view during 
the causes and consequences examination are something need to be considered, 
but the simple principle and basic knowledge due to the deviation occured are 
also one thing that can help the process of examination.  
 
6.4.  Safeguard Determination 
The safeguard on the assessment are the existing facility that by the design 
intent it designed to overcome the consequences caused by deviation. The 
existing safeguard are including the indicator that shows the parameters and 
automatic alarm that warn the operator when certain parameters are not in safe 
range. 
 
6.5.  Action Required Determination 
The action need to be taken in case certain hazard occur are the 
recommendation that the examiners suggest so that the consequences or the 
effect can be reduced. The action required olso need to be examined so that 
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any potential hazard due to the absence of any safeguard can be covered and 
the overcome planning are determined. 
 
6.6.  List of Abbreviations 
In Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study the components listed in 
assessment are following the original identification as follows in system P&ID 
identification system. To ease the identification the complete defintion of each 
components listed are explained in Table 5.3 below. 
 
Table 5.3 List of Abbreviations 
No Abbreviation Definition 
1 HV Hand Valve 
2 CV Control Valve 
3 SDV Shutdown Valve 
4 BV Butterfly Valve 
5 PSV Pressure Safety Valve 
6 SV Safety Valve 
7 PI Pressure Indicator 
8 TI Temperature Indicator 
9 ATG Automatic Tank Gauging 
10 ESD Emergency Shutdown 
11 LAH Level Alarm High 
12 LAL Level Alarm Low 
13 RED Reducer 
14 STR Strainer 
15 P Pump 
16 AV  Automatic Valve (Ball 
Valve) 
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CHAPTER 7  
FREQUENCY ANALYSIS 
 
7.1.  General Description 
Frequency analysis are used to identified the probability of the system’s 
components to fail so that the escalation of components failure can lead into 
hazardous event. The process of frequency analysis are involving two cind of 
probabilistic factor methods which are Fault Tree Analysis and Event Tree 
Analysis.  Fault tree analysis will identified each component’s individual failure 
frequency that can contribute into system failure. The event tree analysis are 
induced the assessment from components failure into the event of hazard and 
it’s consequencies such as Jet Fire, Flash Fire, etc. The typical event tree in 
hydrocarbon handling process especially in LPG facility are shown in Figure 7.1. 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Event Tree for LPG Handling (Selvan, 2015) 
 
The components failure frequencies can be derrived from specific source of 
data. The data can be conduct from previous occurence onsite facility, or similar 
facility’s failure frequency from other places. On this thesis the failure frequencies 
of the components are conducted from DNV Failure Frequencies Guidelines and 
OGP (Oil and GAS Producers) Process Release Frequencies. The data source 
mentioned are for components on the system but not including the storage 
facility. Since in this thesis the object are including the assesmnet of the storage 
facility, the storage failure frequencies are conducted from OGP (Oil and Gas 
Producers) Storage Incident Frequencies.  
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7.2.  Table of Components Failure Frequencies 
Table 7.1 Node 1 Failure Frequency 
Node 1 Frequencies/Hole Diameters 
No Equipment Identification Size 1-3 mm 3-10 mm 10-50 mm 50-150 mm >150 mm 
1 Hand Valve 
(Manual) 
HV 0010 10" 1,18E-05 5,22E-05 2,26E-05 4,97E-06 4,46E-06 
2 Butterfly 
Valve 
(Manual) 
BV 001 10" 1,18E-05 5,22E-05 2,26E-05 4,97E-06 4,46E-06 
3 Shutdown 
Valve 
(Actuated) 
SDV 001 10" 5,669E-04 1,748E-04 5,238-05 7,46E-06 1,314E-05 
4 Control Valve 
(Actuated) 
CV 0001 10" 5,669E-05 1,748E-05 5,238-06 1,00E+00 1,314E-06 
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 Table 7.2 Node 2 Failure Frequency  
Node 2 Frequencies/Hole Diameters 
No Equipment Identification Size 1-3 mm 3-10 mm 10-50 mm 50-150 mm >150 mm 
1 Hand Valve 
(Manual) 
HV 0001 10" 1,18E-05 5,22E-05 2,26E-05 4,97E-06 4,46E-06 
HV 003 
  
2 Butterfly 
Valve 
(Manual) 
BV 002 10" 1,18E-05 5,22E-05 2,26E-05 4,97E-06 4,46E-06 
3 Shutdown 
Valve 
(Actuated) 
SDV 003 10" 5,669E-04 1,748E-04 5,238-05 7,46E-06 1,314E-05 
4 Control Valve 
(Actuated) 
CV 0002 10" 5,669E-05 1,748E-05 5,238-06 1,00E+00 1,314E-06 
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Table 7.3 Node 3 Failure Frequency 
Node 3 Frequencies/Hole Diameters 
No Equipment Identification Size 1-3 mm 3-10 mm 10-50 mm 50-150 mm >150 mm 
1 Hand Valve 
(Manual) 
HV 0008 4" 5,85E-06 2,54E-03 1,12E-06 5,18E-06 0 
HV 0006 
  
2 Butterfly 
Valve 
(Manual) 
BV 004 4" 5,85E-06 2,54E-03 1,12E-06 5,18E-06 0 
3 Shutdown 
Valve 
(Actuated) 
SDV 004 4" 5,487E-04 1,702E-04 5,070E-05 2,026E-05 0 
4 Control 
Valve 
(Actuated) 
CV 0003 4" 5,487E-05 1,702E-05 5,070E-06 2,026E-06 1 
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Table 7.4 Node 4 Failure Frequency 
Node 4 Frequencies/Hole Diameters 
No Equipment Identification Size 1-3 mm 3-10 mm 10-50 mm 50-150 mm >150 mm 
1 Hand Valve 
(Manual) 
HV 0012 4" 5,85E-06 2,54E-03 1,12E-06 5,18E-06 0 
2 Butterfly 
Valve 
(Manual) 
BV 003 4" 5,85E-06 2,54E-03 1,12E-06 5,18E-06 0 
3 Shutdown 
Valve 
(Actuated) 
SDV 0002 4" 5,487E-04 1,702E-04 5,070E-05 2,026E-05 0 
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Table 7.5 Node 5 Failure Frequency 
Node 5 Frequencies/Hole Diameters 
No Equipment Identification Size 1-3 mm 3-10 mm 10-50 mm 50-150 mm >150 mm 
1 Pressure 
Safety Valve 
(Actuated) 
PSV 1102 6" 5,540E-04 1,70E-04 5,07E-05 2,026E-05 0 
PSV 1102 
PSV 1201 
PSV 1202 
PSV 1301 
PSV 1302 
PSV 1401 
PSV 1402 
2 Storage Tank     2,3E-06 1,2E-06 7,1E-08 4,30E-08 4,70E-07 
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Table 7.6 Node 6: Receiving Operation Failure Frequency 
Node 6: Receiving Operation Frequencies/Hole Diameters 
No Equipment Identification Size 1-3 mm 3-10 mm 10-50 mm 50-150 mm >150 mm 
1 Hand Valve 
(Manual) 
HV 1103 10" 1,163E-04 5,405E-05 2,261E-05 4,968E-06 4,462E-06 
HV 1203 
HV 1303 
HV 1403 
HV 1114 4" 5,85E-06 2,54E-03 1,12E-06 5,18E-06 0 
HV 1214 
HV 1314 
HV 1414 
2 Shutdown 
Valve 
(Actuated) 
SDV 1101 10" 5,669E-04 1,702E-04 5,238-05 7,462E-06 1,314E-05 
SDV 1201 
SDV 1301 
SDV 1401 
SDV 1104 4" 5,487E-04 1,702E-04 5,070E-05 2,026E-05 0 
SDV 1204 
SDV 1304 
SDV 1404 
3 Control 
Valve 
(Actuated) 
CV 110 10" 5,669E-04 1,702E-04 5,238-05 7,462E-06 1,314E-05 
CV 120 
CV 130 
CV 140 
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Table 7.6 Node 6: Distribution Operation Failure Frequency 
Node 6: Distribution Operation Frequencies/Hole Diameters 
No Equipment Identification Size 1-3 mm 3-10 mm 10-50 mm 50-150 mm >150 mm 
1 Hand 
Valve(Manual) 
HV 1104 12" 8,4E-05 4,3E-05 2,3E-05 6,3E-06 7,8E-06 
HV 1204 
HV 1304 
2 Shutdown 
Valve 
(Actuated) 
SDV 1103 3,3E-04 1,4E-04 6,0E-05 1,3E-05 1,8E-05 
SDV 1203 
SDV 1304 
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Table 7.6 Node 6: Intertank Operation Failure Frequency 
Node 6: Intertank Operation Frequencies/Hole Diameters 
No Equipment Identification Size 1-3 mm 3-10 mm 10-50 mm 50-150 mm >150 mm 
1 Hand Valve( 
Manual) 
HV 1051 10" 1,163E-04 5,405E-05 2,261E-05 4,968E-06 4,462E-06 
HV 1103 
HV 1203 
HV 1303 
HV 1403 
2 Control 
Valve(Actuated) 
CV 1061 5,669E-04 1,702E-04 5,238-05 7,462E-06 1,314E-05 
CV 110 
CV 120 
CV 130 
CV 140 
3 Shutdown Valve 
(Actuated) 
SDV 1101 5,669E-04 1,702E-04 5,238-05 7,462E-06 1,314E-05 
SDV 1201 
SDV 1301 
SDV 1401 
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Table 7.6 Node 7 Failure Frequency 
Node 7 Frequencies/Hole Diameters 
No Equipment Identification Size 1-3 mm 3-10 mm 10-50 mm 50-150 mm >150 mm 
1 Hand 
Valve(Manual) 
HV 1501 6" 6,984E-05 3,032E-05 1,337E-05 2,983E-06 3,047E-06 
HV 1601 
HV 1701 
HV 1801 
HV 1502 4" 5,85E-06 2,54E-03 1,12E-06 5,18E-06 0 
HV 1602 
HV 1702 
HV 1802 
2 Control 
Valve(Actuated) 
CV 1501 4" 5,487E-04 1,702E-04 5,070E-05 2,026E-05 0 
CV 1601 
CV 1701 
CV 1801 
3 Centrifugal 
Pump 
P 110 6" 4,044e-03 1,432E-03 4,973E-04 8,411E-05 4,276E-05 
P 120 
P 130 
P 140 
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Table 7.6 Node 8 Failure Frequency 
Node 8 Frequencies/Hole Diameters 
No Equipment Identification Size 1-3 mm 3-10 mm 10-50 mm 50-150 mm >150 mm 
1 Hand 
Valve(Manual) 
HV 1011 4" 5,85E-06 2,54E-03 1,12E-06 5,18E-06 0 
HV 2604 
HV 2609 
HV 2606 
HV 2509 
HV 2506 
HV 2509 
HV 2402 
HV 2403 
HV 2301 
HV 2302 
HV 2303 
HV 2203 
HV 2101 
HV 2103 
2 Shutdown 
Valve(Actuated) 
SDV 2502 4" 5,487E-04 1,702E-04 5,070E-05 2,026E-05 0 
SDV 2401 
SDV 2402 
SDV 2301 
SDV 2201 
SDV 2101 
3 Control 
Valve(Actuated) 
DCV 2401 4" 5,487E-04 1,702E-04 5,070E-05 2,026E-05 0 
DCV 2401 
DCV 2101 
68 
 
 
7.3.  Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Fault Tree Analysis is a schematic process that using a diagram to represent 
the possible outcome start from the most basic event and using logical gateway 
(eg. AND OR) to lead the analysis into the top event. On this thesis the concern 
of the components failures are the release frequency since the release lead into 
gas dispersion, and the escalation of gas dispersion when its ignited will become 
a fire incident event. So, on this thesis the failure of FTA will be determine as the 
release of gas from the system.  
Since the components failure frequency are already determined in previous 
subsection the Fault Tree Analysis are giving us the linkage between components 
failure into system failure, the entire system already divided into subsystem into 
several nodes, the Fault Tree Analysis give the probability of failure each node, 
and contribution of each node failure probability into entire system failure 
probability.  
The basic logical gate of FTA can be determined using the AND OR logic the 
explanation of the logic are explained below:  
 Top event 
Top event is a uppermost gate that explain what kind of failure 
analyzed 
 OR gate 
The output event associated with this gate exists if at least one of the 
input events exists. The mathematical equation for this logic can be 
represent using:  
P(AꓵB) = P(A) x P(B) 
 AND gate the output event associated with this gate exists only if all 
of the input events exist simultaneously. The mathematical equation 
for this logic can be represent using: 
P(AꓴB) = P(A) + P(B) – P(AꓵB) 
 Basic event 
Basic events are the lowermost event that in the system can occur. 
Since the frequency of release frequency are consist of various bore diameter 
the process of FTA also have to acomodate the various of bore size diameter for 
every node calculation. 
On this thesis the process of Fault Tree Analysis are using Relex Evaluation 
Software. The software are helping to develop the calculation of the FTA value 
and also the graphical representation of FTA. 
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Figure 7,2 FTA Result of Node 5 Bore Size Diameter 50-150 mm 
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7.3.1.  Fault Tree Result Recapitulation 
The result of each Node Fault Tree Analysis and its variable of every leak bore size diameter can be seen on Table 7.8. 
 
Table 7.8 Fault Tree Recapitulation 
Node Top Event 
(Scenario) 
Failure Frequency 
1-3 mm 3-10 mm 10-50 mm 50-150 mm >150 mm 
1 Gas Release 1,157E-4 4,494E-4 1,4996E-4 2,4868E-5 3,52E-5 
2 Gas Release 1,169E-4 5,016E-4 1,7256E-4 2,9843E-5 3,966E-5 
3 Gas Release 6,177E-4 5,799E-4 1,0364E-4 5,088E-5 0 
4 Gas Release 5,557E-4 5,25E-4 5,294E-5 3,062E-5 0 
5 Gas Release 3,58762E-15 1,3553E-14 1,36553E-16 2,8656E-21 4,87968E-26 
6 Receiving Gas Release 4,951E-4 1,1738E-3 5,0904E-4 1,5148E-4 6,5946E-5 
6 
Distribution 
Gas Release 2,9376e-14 1,12151e-15 4,74583e-17 1,3874e-19 4,43077e-19 
7 Gas Release 4,72596e-10 9,37514e-11 6,86068e-14 7,69633e-10 4,40278e-18 
8 Gas Release 3,321e-3 1,6261e-3 3,098e-4 1,5264e-4 0 
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7.4.  Event Tree Analysis 
The Event Tree Analysis is a method to predict the probability of certain event. 
Event tree analyze the intial event and based certain probability will conduct the 
escalation of the intial event. Since on ths thesis are concerning on fire risk 
assessment the intial event are gas dispersion which the frequency of gas 
dispersion derrived from the Fault Tree Analysis. The escalation of gas dispersion 
will become fire if there is a ignition of fire, the probability of ignition are using 
the database conducted in Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) Ignition Probability. To 
calculate the ignition probability the process will need the amount of gas released 
from the system. Since the frequencies data from Fault Tree Analysis are ranged 
value, the diameter to be taken to calculate the gas release are using the higher 
value of range in hole diameter (eg. For range 1-3 mm hole, the gas release 
amount will be taken from 3 mm hole). The equation to calculate gas release 
amount are derrived from DNV Failure Frequency guide, the equation are: 
 
    𝑄𝑔 = 𝐶𝑑 . 𝐴. 𝑃𝑜 √
𝑀𝛾
𝑅𝑇𝑜
(
2
𝛾+1
)
𝛾+1
𝛾−1    (7.1) (DNV, 
2014) 
 
Where: 
Qg : initial gas release rate (kg/s) 
Cd : discharge coefficient 
A : hole area (m2) 
Po : initial pressure of gas absolute (N/m2) 
M : molecular weight of gas 
𝛾 : ratio specific heats 
R : universal gas constant (8314 J/kg mol K) 
To : initial temperature of gas (K) 
 
By approximating the gauge pressure to absolute pressure subtituting γ = 
1,31, CD = 0,85 and converting the units of pressure to bar and noting that the 
units of the diameter are in mm the equation will become: 
 
𝑄𝑔 = 1,4 𝑥 10−2 . 𝑑2. √𝜌𝑔𝑃𝑔  (7.2) (DNV, 2014) 
Where: 
Qg : initial gas release rate (kg/s) 
ρg : initial density of gas (kg/m
2) 
Pg : initial pressure of gas (bar gauge) 
d : diameter of the hole 
72 
 
 
To find the gas release, considering the density of LPG Gases are 0,63 and 
the operational pressure of the Terminal are 13 BarG. The tabulation of gas relase 
mass at variation of leak hole diameter can be seen on Table 7.9. 
Table 7.9 Mass of Gas Release (Oil and Gas Producers, 2013) 
No Hole Diameter (mm) Mass of Gas Release at higher range of 
Hole(kg/s) 
1 3 3,5190E-3 
2 10 3,9100E-2 
3 50 9,7750E-1 
4 150 8,7975E+0 
5 >150 2,5226E+1 
 
The result above then plotted into the ignition probability chart in Figure 7.21 
or the process can be done by interpolate the value in between release rate from 
Table so this process get exact amount of the ignition probability in various leak 
hole diameter. 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Chart of Ignition Probability (Oil and Gas Producers, 2013) 
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Table 7.10 Ignition Probability For Large LPG Plant (Oil and Gas Producers, 2013) 
Release Rate 
(kg/s) 
Ignition Probability 
0,1 0,0010 
0,2 0,0013 
0,5 0,0019 
1 0,0025 
2 0,0050 
5 0,0125 
10 0,0250 
20 0,0500 
50 0,1250 
100 0,2500 
200 0,5000 
500 0,6500 
1000 0,6500 
(Source: OGP Ignition Probability)  
 
In the Event Tree Analysis the escalation of probability divided into 2 (two) 
events. The first event are immidiate ignition that will become Jet Fire, or delayed 
ignition which will become Flash Fire. The probability of every ignition which on 
will become ignited and which one are not are further explained in Oil and Gas 
Producers Ignition Probability as seen in Table 7.11. 
 
Table 7.11 Immidiate and Delayed Ignition Probability (Oil and Gas Producers, 2013) 
Release Type Immidiate Igition Delayed Ignition 
Shallow Gas Blowout 0,07 0,11 
Deep Blowout 0,09 - 
Deep Well Release 0,03 - 
 
From the data listed above now the process can coclude the Event Tree 
Analysis so the probability of escalated event form each scenario and each 
variations of leak hole diameters can be determined. 
 
7.4.1.  Event Description 
The possible event on hydrocarbon material when its released are majorly 
become fire if there is an ignition. The variable fire event are depends on the 
environment of the subject and and how the gas released ignite. On this sub 
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section will explained what the possible event that may occur based on the 
Terminal LPG Semarang condition. 
1. Jet Fire 
Jet Fire is occur when there are leak on the pressurized system, so the gas 
released. The released then immidiately ignite so that the fire form 
become what so called “jet” so this type of fire called Jet Fire. 
2. Flash Fire  
This type of event is occur when the gas released from leaked but not 
ignite immiediately. The process is delayed until certain time and the gas 
are reach its saturated point and then ignited. The result are quick fire 
event and immediately disperse. 
3. Explosion 
The event of explosion on Terminal LPG Semarang is not considered 
because no pipe or storgage are burried in the soil, so that no external 
pressure that caused the system to be pressed from outside and caused 
such an explosion.  
4. Gas Dispersion 
Dispersion is an event when the gas eak are not ignited at all and just 
disperse into atmosphere. From the perspective of fire risk the gas 
dispersion are not dangerous, since the gas dispersion are not 
contributed into fire event. 
 
0,81935
0,07065
0,11
Jet Fire
0,05
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
Storage Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
3,45E-27
2,68E-28
4,00E-26
4,88E-26
0,95 5,10E-27
Flash Fire
Explossion
  
Figure 7.4 Event Tree of Node 5 Bore Size >150 mm 
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Table 7.12 Recapitulation for Event Frequencies 
Node  Hole 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Scenario Frequencies 
Jet Fire Flash Fire Explosion Gas Dispersion   
1 3 1,16E-07 1,27E-05 - 1,03E-04 
10 4,49E-07 4,94E-05 - 4,00E-04 
50 3,71E-07 1,65E-05 - 1,33E-04 
150 4,60E-07 2,74E-06 - 2,17E-05 
>150 2,49E-06 3,87E-06 - 2,88E-05 
2 3 1,17E-07 1,29E-05 - 1,04E-04 
10 5,02E-07 5,52E-05 - 4,46E-04 
50 4,27E-07 1,90E-05 - 1,53E-04 
150 5,52E-07 3,28E-06 - 2,60E-05 
>150 2,80E-06 4,36E-06 - 3,25E-05 
3 3 6,18E-07 6,79E-05 - 5,49E-04 
10 5,80E-07 6,38E-05 - 5,16E-04 
50 2,56E-07 1,14E-05 - 9,20E-05 
150 9,42E-07 5,60E-06 - 4,43E-05 
>150 0 0 - 0 
4 3 5,56E-07 6,11E-05 - 4,94E-04 
10 5,25E-07 5,78E-05 - 4,67E-04 
50 1,31E-07 5,82E-06 - 4,70E-05 
150 5,67E-07 3,37E-06 - 2,67E-05 
>150 0 0 - 0 
5 3 3,59E-18 1,97E-17 3,75E-16 3,19E-15 
10 1,36E-17 7,45E-17 1,42E-15 1,20E-14 
50 3,38E-19 7,51E-19 1,43E-17 1,21E-16 
150 5,30E-23 1,58E-23 2,99E-22 2,50E-21 
>150 3,45E-27 2,68E-28 5,10E-27 4,00E-26 
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Node  Hole 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Scenario Frequencies 
Jet Fire Flash Fire Explosion Gas Dispersion   
6 
Receiving 
3 4,95E-07 5,45E-05 - 4,40E-04 
10 1,17E-06 1,29E-04 - 1,04E-03 
50 1,26E-06 5,60E-05 - 4,52E-04 
150 2,80E-06 1,67E-05 - 1,32E-04 
>150 4,66E-06 7,25E-06 - 5,40E-05 
6 
Distributio
n 
3 2,94E-17 3,23E-15 - 2,61E-14 
10 1,12E-18 1,23E-16 - 9,97E-16 
50 1,17E-19 5,22E-18 - 4,21E-17 
150 2,57E-21 1,53E-20 - 1,21E-19 
>150 3,13E-20 4,87E-20 - 3,63E-19 
7 3 4,73E-13 5,20E-11 - 4,20E-10 
10 9,38E-14 1,03E-11 - 8,33E-11 
50 1,70E-16 7,55E-15 - 6,09E-14 
150 1,42E-11 8,47E-11 - 6,71E-10 
>150 3,11E-19 4,84E-19 - 3,61E-18 
8 3 3,32E-06 3,65E-04 - 2,95E-03 
10 1,63E-06 1,79E-04 - 1,45E-03 
50 7,66E-07 3,41E-05 - 2,75E-04 
150 2,83E-06 1,68E-05 - 1,33E-04 
>150 0 0 - 0 
Continued from previous Table 
  
77 
 
CHAPTER 8 
CONSEQUENCES ANALYSIS 
 
8.1.  General Description 
The process of Quantitative Risk Assessment is including the consequnces 
analysis to determine the effect of the described scenario in frequencies analysis 
into the people in the surrounding area or so called the societal risk. On this 
assessment case the major concern is how the fire will behave based on certain 
site/facility parameters and its location into the people or the workers around the 
site. The process of consequences analysis on this thesis is using Process Hazard 
Analysis Software Tools that will provide visual modelling of how big the affected 
area and the probable severity effect into the workers of Terminal LPG Semarang 
based on certain parameters. The process on consequences analysis also need to 
determine the receiver area of the possible incident and the amount of people 
covered on those area. 
 
8.2.  Receiver Determination 
Receiver is a point to determine a place to conduct the consequences 
modelling. Since the previous system and area dtermination in nodes mode have 
too big coverage area the receiver determination will emphasize on the higher 
concentration of worker in every node or area. The amount of worker in the 
receiver later will become the platform to determine the fatality number of the 
hazard. The complete table of the receiver and amount of worker contained in 
those receiver can be seen on the Table 8.1.  
 
Table 8.1. Receiver Determination 
Receiver Location Corresponding 
Node 
Amount of 
worker(s) 
1 Marine Loading Arm area 
and control station 
1 6 
2 Meterring Station 2 2 
3 Storage Area (V110, V120, 
V130, V140 
5 5 
4 Storage Area System 6 5 
5 Office and Control Room 5 25 
6 Warehouse 5 4 
7 Pump House 7 1 
8 Powerhouse 6 2 
9 Filling Shed 8 15 
10 Skid Tank Parking Area 8 20 
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8.3.  Consequences Modelling of Jet Fire using Process Hazard 
Analysis Software Tool 
Jet Fire hazard occur when the leak from pipeline or containtment 
immediately ignited and create an fire in such a “jet” form. The consequences 
modelling later will be analyzed into the number of people affected in the 
receiver area and will be platform to determine the level of the risk based on the 
Hazard’s Level of Concern (LOC) on this thesis using Process Hazard Analysis 
Software Tools the program can determine  the Level of Concern (LOC) as our 
need. The Level of Concern (LOC) for jet fire are determined by jet fire intensity 
radiation which are: 25 kW/m2, 35 kW/m2, and 45 kW/m2, This Level of Concern 
are determined based on communication with Head of HSE departement at 
Terminal LPG Semarang refer to their policy and ease the process to 
determination in risk representation using comapany risk matrix. The visual 
representation of Jet Fire heat intensity radiation can be seen on Figure 8.1. The 
complete result for consequences modelling can be found on Appendix 6. 
 
 
 
Heat Intensity Radiation Area for Jet Fire 
                        25 kW/m2  
  35 kW/m2 
45 kW/m2 
Figure 8.1. Jet Fire Consequences on Jetty and MLA for Leak Scenario 150 mm 
 
       The complete data recapitulation of jet fire at every receiver and leak 
scenario can be seen at Table 8.2. 
0,000 0,030 0,060
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Table 8.2. Consequences Datasheet for Jet Fire 
Consequences Data For Jet Fire Consequences Datasheet 
No. Receiver Leak Bore 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Corresponding Node No. Of People Heat Intensity Radius (m) 
25 kw/m2 35 kw/m2 45 kw/m2 
1 Jetty & MLA 3 1 6 - - - 
10 10,03 7,48 - 
50 36,83 27,16 17,82 
150 82,59 57,13 35,82 
2 Metering Station 3 2 2 - - - 
10 10,03 7,48 - 
50 36,83 27,16 17,82 
150 82,59 57,13 35,82 
3 Storage Area V110 3 5 5 - - - 
10 10,03 7,48 - 
50 36,83 27,16 17,82 
150 82,59 57,13 35,82 
4 Storage Area V120 3 5 5 - - - 
10 10,03 7,48 - 
50 36,83 27,16 17,82 
150 82,59 57,13 35,82 
5 Storage Area V130 3 5 5 - - - 
10 10,03 7,48 - 
50 36,83 27,16 17,82 
150 82,59 57,13 35,82 
6 Storage Area V140 3 5 5 - - - 
10 10,03 7,48 - 
50 36,83 27,16 17,82 
150 82,59 57,13 35,82 
7 Storage Area System 3 6 5 - - - 
10 10,03 7,48 - 
50 36,83 27,16 17,82 
150 82,59 57,13 35,82 
8 Office and Control 
Room 
3 5 25 - - - 
10 - - - 
50 - - - 
150 - - - 
9 Warehouse 3 5 4 - - - 
10 - - - 
50 - - - 
150 - - - 
10 Pump house 3 7 1 - - - 
10 10,98 7,48 - 
50 34,25 24,85 13,54 
150 80,72 51,11 29,76 
11 Powerhouse 3 6 2 - - - 
10 - - - 
50 - - - 
150 51,75 48,06 - 
12 Filling Shed 3 8 15 - - - 
10 10,98 7,48 - 
50 34,25 24,85 13,54 
150 80,72 51,11 29,76 
13 Skid Tank Parking Area 3 8 20 - - - 
10 - - - 
50 - - - 
150 21,34 - - 
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8.4.  Consequences Modelling of Flash Fire using Process Hazard 
Analysis Software Tools 
Flash Fire hazard is occur when leak from containtment or pipe and not 
immediately ignited (delayed). The saturated concentration of LPG that been 
released than later burnt create quick or flash ignition of flames. On the Process 
Hazard Analysis Software Tools the coverage of Flash Fire area are deternined 
using the envlope of gas released that contained in the air that ignited. In this 
case the Level of Concern of content of the gas released are 8.000 ppm and 
17.000 ppm. During the events of flash fire the area coverage of flash fire area 
not affceted much by wind direction since the flash fire occurence typically occur 
at one point at time and not continously happend so the envelope of coverage 
area will only shown the circle pattern without  The depiction of Flash Fire 
envelope can be seen on Figure 8.2. 
To predict the radiation effects from burning vapour cloud it is necessary to 
know the size and shape of the fire, position, the radioactive properties of the 
flame and how these factors vary with time. There are no fundamental theoritical 
models available to evaluate this. A model that accurately represent all the 
features that have been observed experimentally would be very complex. 
Fortunately for determination of hazard zone beyond the cloud boundary caused 
by thermal radiation from a cloud fire may not be primary significance. This is 
because the size of flammable hazard zone is essential determined by the size of 
the cloud, which can be calculated fwom vapour dispersion model. Thats why on 
the risk representation of flash fire on this research are shown in ppm unit, which 
measure the content of gas vapour content on the air that potentially become 
flash fire, or in the modelling would be mentioned as flash fire envelope. 
 The complete result for consequences modelling can be found on Appendix 
6. 
 
0,00 0,02 0,04
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Flash Fire Envlope 
                        8.000 ppm 
  17.000 ppm 
Figure 8.2. Flash Fire Envelope for Storage Tank for leak scenario 50 mm 
 
The complete recapitulation Table for Flash Fire Envelope can be seen on Table 
8.3. 
 
8.4.1.  Conversion of Flash Fire Envelope Into Heat Intensity 
The outcome from consequence modelling only shows the envelope of 
potential flammable gas conten being released. The consequences in other hand 
it eed the severity level to be determined in a depiction that can be converted ito 
severity of individual loss.  
Eventhough the theoritical fundamental to calculate the heat release has not 
developed yet to determine the level of heat released intensity, the simple 
approach to calculate the heat released can be addopted. The approach is to 
convert the content of LPG in the air into mass and then calculate the heat release 
from the heating value. The calculation of the conversion can be seen below: 
 
Where: 
Density of air   = 1,644 kg/m3 
1 ppm    = 1 mg/kg 
1,644 kg of air contains  = 1,644 x 10-6 kg of LPG  
Heating Value of LPG = 46.011,448 kJ/kg 
Level of LPG Content = 8.000 ppm  = 0,013312 kg 
   17.000 ppm = 0,027948 kg 
      Heat Release  = NHV of LPG x mass content of LPG 
So, 
      Heat Release of 8.000 ppm LPG 
      Q = 0,013312 x 46.011,448 = 4,286058 kW/m3 
      Heat Release of 17.000 ppm LPG 
      Q = 0,027948 x 46.001,448 = 9,107874 kW/m3 
 
After the conversion of the Flash Fire Envelope modelling the risk representation 
will be the heat release amount that will be plotted into severity index. The further 
explanation of severity index of Flash Fire can be seen on Table 9.2. After the 
conversion the modelling result will further considered as heat radiation. 
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Table 8.3. Consequences Datasheet for Flash Fire 
Consequences Data For Flash Fire Consequences Datasheet 
No. Receiver Leak Bore Diameter 
(mm) 
Corresponding Node No. Of People Gas Content Radius (m) 
8000 ppm 17000 ppm 
1 Jetty & MLA 3 1 6 1,2 0,5 
10 4,03 1,83 
50 14,38 8,42 
150 15,94 9,5 
2 Metering Station 3 2 2 1,2 0,5 
10 3,71 1,81 
50 14,38 8,42 
150 15,94 9,5 
3 Storage Area V110 3 5 5 1,2 0,5 
10 3,71 1,81 
50 20,51 9,19 
150 59,19 32,68 
4 Storage Area V120 3 5 5 1,2 0,5 
10 3,71 1,81 
50 20,51 9,19 
150 59,19 32,68 
5 Storage Area V130 3 5 5 1,2 0,5 
10 3,71 1,81 
50 20,51 9,19 
150 59,19 32,68 
6 Storage Area V140 3 5 5 1,2 0,5 
10 3,71 1,81 
50 20,51 9,19 
150 59,19 32,68 
7 Storage Area System 3 6 5 1,2 0,5 
10 4,03 1,83 
50 14,38 8,42 
150 15,94 9,5 
8 Office and Control Room 3 5 25 - - 
10 - - 
50 - - 
150 - - 
9 Warehouse 3 5 4 - - 
10 - - 
50 - - 
150 - - 
10 Pump house 3 7 1 1,17 0,53 
10 3,91 1,87 
50 8,85 5,38 
150 9,21 5,65 
11 Powerhouse 3 6 2 - - 
10 - - 
50 - - 
150 - - 
12 Filling Shed 3 8 15 1,17 0,53 
10 3,91 1,87 
50 8,85 5,38 
150 9,21 5,65 
13 Skid Tank Parking Area 3 8 20 - - 
10 - - 
50 - - 
150 - - 
83 
 
 
 
8.5.  Consequences Modelling of Explosion using Process Hazard 
Analysis Tools Sofware 
The explosion considered is Vapour Cloud Explossio which may occur only in 
storage tank which involve pressure vessels that contained the most LPG on the 
terminal make the storage tank the only facility with possible explosion hazard. 
The Level of Concern of the explosion using Process Hazard Analysis Software 
Tools are determined using the amount of pressure at corresponding radius from 
the center of the explosion. The value of corresponding explosion based on the 
modelling are 0,2 bar, 1,3 bar, and 2,0 bar. Same as flash fire the explosion 
envelope on the modelling will not shows any affection by the winds, since the 
explosion typically only occur once at a time and not affected by time function 
variable. The visual depiction of the explosion radiation zone can be seen on 
Figure 8.3. The complete result for consequences modelling can be found on 
Appendix 6. 
 
 
Explosion Pressure 
                        0,2 bar  
  1,3 bar 
  2,0 bar 
Figure 8.3. Explosion Zone of Storage Tank for Leak Scenario 50 mm 
 
      The complete recapitulation for explosion hazard can be seen on Table 8.4. 
0,00 0,04 0,08
km
84 
 
 
Table 8.4. Consequences Datasheet for Explosion 
Consequences Data For Explosion Consequences Datasheet 
No. Receiver Leak Bore Diameter 
(mm) 
Corresponding Node No. Of People Explosion Radius (m) 
0,2 bar 1,3 bar 2,0 bar 
1 Jetty & MLA 3 1 6 - - - 
10 - - - 
50 - - - 
150 - - - 
2 Metering Station 3 2 2 - - - 
10 - - - 
50 - - - 
150 - - - 
3 Storage Area V110 3 5 5 7,84 2,77 2,37 
10 21,937 6,42 5,19 
50 61,02 16,58 13,06 
150 99,25 26,44 20,68 
4 Storage Area V120 3 5 5 7,84 2,77 2,37 
10 21,937 6,42 5,19 
50 61,02 16,58 13,06 
150 99,25 26,44 20,68 
5 Storage Area V130 3 5 5 7,84 2,77 2,37 
10 21,937 6,42 5,19 
50 61,02 16,58 13,06 
150 99,25 26,44 20,68 
6 Storage Area V140 3 5 5 7,84 2,77 2,37 
10 21,937 6,42 5,19 
50 61,02 16,58 13,06 
150 99,25 26,44 20,68 
7 Storage Area System 3 6 5 - - - 
10 - - - 
50 - - - 
150 - - - 
8 Office and Control Room 3 5 25 - - - 
10 - - - 
50 - - - 
150 - - - 
9 Warehouse 3 5 4 - - - 
10 - - - 
50 - - - 
150 - - - 
10 Pump house 3 7 1 - - - 
10 - - - 
50 - - - 
150 - - - 
11 Powerhouse 3 6 2 - - - 
10 - - - 
50 - - - 
150 - - - 
12 Filling Shed 3 8 15 - - - 
10 - - - 
50 - - - 
150 - - - 
13 Skid Tank Parking Area 3 8 20 - - - 
10 - - - 
50 - - - 
150 - - - 
 
  
85 
 
CHAPTER 9 
RISK REPRESENTATION 
 
9.1.  General 
The risk assessment  usually will  represent its level of risk by using the risk 
mapping method the commony used are F/N Curve which shows the number of 
fatality and its frequency, and another one is risk matrix which depend on which 
aspect that  shall be plotted based on the axis of the matrix. On this thesis the  
application of risk representatio is using company (Terminal LPG Semarang) risk 
matrix since Terminal LPG Semarang has develop their own risk criteria in the 
purpose to determine the level of risk of activity on the terminal. The company 
risk matrix can be seen on the Figure 9.1. 
 
RISK LEVEL 
  
  
  
  
 L
IK
E
L
IH
O
O
D
  5 5 10 15 20 25 
4 4 8 12 16 20 
3 3 6 9 12 15 
2 2 4 6 8 10 
1 1 2 3 4 5 
SCALE 
1 2 3 4 5 
SEVERITY CONSEQUENCES 
Figure 9.1. Company Risk Matrix 
 
The risk matrix of Terminal LPG Semarang shows the level of severity and 
likelihood. The level of lkelihood can be determined using the frequency of 
possible hazard that have been calculated on ETA on the previous chapter. The 
level of severity are determined based on variation of the impact based on hazard 
radius in the consequences modelling and then transferred into lost of workdays 
of the workers affected by the hazard. Because every hazard for example Jet Fire 
has different intensity radiation, every hazard have its variatio in the severity level. 
To validate the risk level the radiatio then plotted into the possible people 
suffered per receiver location. For example the jet fire hazard at 45 kW/m2 have 
the severity level of 4 (four) in the risk matrix so it shall be classified as high risk 
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level, but since  the radiation zone of 45 kW/m2 is rather a small radius its possily 
that that level of intensity may not affected any people or workers. So, as the 
purpose  to validate the risk level the number of people affected in the receiver 
need to be consider. As the consideration the risk representation has limitation 
such as the hazard of Jet Fire at 3 mm leak size diameter can not be represented  
because the 3 mm leak can not modelled using Process Hazard Analysis Software 
Tools because the limit to model the consequences since the effect may be very 
small to depicted. So note that in risk representationi there will be no risk 
representation for Jet Fire leak 3 mm scenario. Another things to consider is that 
since the level of severity may be not accurately describe the outcome the 
process of determining the severity level has been conducted by communicating 
with the Terminal LPG Semarang. The complete risk representation for each 
scenario can be seen at Table below. Another think to consider that in company 
risk matrix the likelihood axis have the most likely event is at once at 10 years or 
so that considered 1 x 10-1 frequency. It makes the scenarion on the assesment 
determined as  
For consideration the various level of severity based on the scenario can be 
seen on Table 9.1, 9.2. and 9.3 meanwhile the complete descriptive explanation 
of the risk matrix can be found on chapter 4.3.2. 
 
Table 9.1. Jet Fire Severity Index 
Jet Fire Severity Index 
Level of Concern Severity Level 
25 kW/m2 1 
35 kW/m2 3 
45 kW/m2 4 
 
Table 9.2. Flash Fire Severity Index 
Flash Fire Severity Index 
Level of Concern Severity Level 
4,286058 kW/m3 1 
9,107874 kW/m3 3 
 
Table 9.3. Explosion Severity Index 
Explosion Severity Index 
Level of Concern Severity Level 
0,2 bar 1 
1,3 bar 3 
2,0 bar 4 
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9.2.  Risk Representation of Jet Fire 
The risk representation of Jet fire usig company risk matrix can be seen on 
Table 9.1. Table 9.1. shows the risk representation for 150 mm leak Jet Fire 
scenario. The  Acceptable status means the scenario is in low risk area, ALARP 
status means the scenario located in medium risk area, and Tolerable status 
indicates that risk may located in hugh risk area but have no possible people 
affected. Further the Jet fire hazard will be concern of the mitigation since the Jet 
Fire has the most excalation effect due to its occurence, not like other hazard 
(Flash Fire and Explosion) which its occurences only take few seconds when its 
happened so there is no possible excalation, meanwhile Jet Fire  can occur up to 
several minutes even hours, that possibly creates further impact. The risk 
representation for 150 mm leak Jet Fire Scenario can be seen on Table 9.4. and 
the complete risk representation of Jet Fire can be found on Appendix 7. 
 
9.3.  Risk Representation of Flash Fire 
The risk representation of flash fire only consist of two severity level based on 
the LPG content in the air that will ignited as flash fire envelope. The Level of 
concern of content are 8.000 ppm and 17.000 ppm. The Level of concern 8.000 
ppm would considered as medium risk in the severity index and 17.000 ppm 
considered as high risk. The risk representation for 150 mm leak Flash Fire 
scenario  can be seen on Table 9.5. and the complete result for Flash Fire risk 
representation can be seen on Appendix 7.  
 
9.4.  Risk Representation of Explosion 
Explosion one of the concerned hazard since it is the most lethal of the 
hazard. The severity of the explosion hazard are based on the pressure caused by 
the explosion the Level of Concern caused by explosion hazard are  2 bar, 13 bar 
and 20 bar. The sevirty index caused by the explosion are already dtermined in 
Table 9.3. The risk representation of 150 mm lek explosion scenarion can be seen 
on Table 9.6.  And the complete recapitulation of all scenarios of explosion ca be 
seen on Appendix 7.  
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Table 9.4. Risk Representation for Jet Fire 150 mm Leak Scenario 
Category: Jet Fire Bore Diameter 
150 mm 
                
                
No. Receiver 
Corresponding 
Node 
Frequencies 
Type of 
Consequences 
Radius (m) Severity Level 
Likelihood 
Level 
Risk Level 
No. Of People 
Affected 
Mitigation 
1 Jetty MLA 1 4,60E-07 
25 kw/m2 82,59 1 1 1 6 NO 
35 kw/m2 57,13 3 1 3 6 NO 
45 kw/m2 35,82 4 1 4 6 YES 
2 Metering Station 2 5,52E-07 
25 kw/m2 82,59 1 1 1 2 NO 
35 kw/m2 57,13 3 1 3 2 NO 
45 kw/m2 35,82 4 1 4 2 YES 
3 Storage Area V110 5 5,30E-23 
25 kw/m2 82,59 1 1 1 5 NO 
35 kw/m2 57,13 3 1 3 5 NO 
45 kw/m2 35,82 4 1 4 5 YES 
4 Storage Area V120 5 5,30E-23 
25 kw/m2 82,59 1 1 1 5 NO 
35 kw/m2 57,13 3 1 3 5 NO 
45 kw/m2 35,82 4 1 4 5 YES 
5 Storage Area V130 5 5,30E-23 
25 kw/m2 82,59 1 1 1 5 NO 
35 kw/m2 57,13 3 1 3 5 NO 
45 kw/m2 35,82 4 1 4 5 YES 
6 Storage Area V140 5 5,30E-23 
25 kw/m2 82,59 1 1 1 5 NO 
35 kw/m2 57,13 3 1 3 5 NO 
45 kw/m2 35,82 4 1 4 5 YES 
7 Storage Area System 6 2,80E-06 
25 kw/m2 82,59 1 1 1 5 NO 
35 kw/m2 57,13 3 1 3 5 NO 
45 kw/m2 35,82 4 1 4 5 YES 
8 Office and Control Room  5 5,30E-23 
25 kw/m2 - 1 1 1 0 NO 
35 kw/m2 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
9 Warehouse 5 5,30E-23 
25 kw/m2 - 1 1 1 0 NO 
35 kw/m2 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
10 Pump house 7 1,42E-11 
25 kw/m2 80,72 1 1 1 1 NO 
35 kw/m2 51,11 3 1 3 1 NO 
45 kw/m2 29,76 4 1 4 1 YES 
11 Powerhouse 6 2,80E-06 
25 kw/m2 - 1 1 1 0 NO 
35 kw/m2 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
12 Filling Shed 8 2,83E-06 
25 kw/m2 80,72 1 1 1 15 NO 
35 kw/m2 51,11 3 1 3 15 NO 
45 kw/m2 29,76 4 1 4 15 yes 
13 Skid Tank Parking Area 8 2,83E-06 
25 kw/m2 21,34 1 1 1 20 NO 
35 kw/m2 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
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Table 9.5. Risk Representation for Flash Fire 150 mm Leak Scenario 
Category: Flash Fire Bore 
Diameter 150 mm 
   
 
  
  
        
                
No. Receiver 
Corresponding 
Node 
Frequencies 
Type of 
Consequences 
Radius (m) Severity Level 
Likelihood 
Level 
Risk Level 
No. Of People 
Affected 
Mitigation 
1 Jetty & MLA 1 2,74E-06 
4,286 kW/m3 15,94 3 1 3 6 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 9,5 4 1 4 6 YES 
2 Metering Station 2 3,28E-06 
4,286 kW/m3 15,94 3 1 3 2 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 9,5 4 1 4 2 YES 
3 Storage Area V110 5 1,58E-23 
4,286 kW/m3 59,19 3 1 3 5 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 32,68 4 1 4 5 YES 
4 Storage Area V120 5 1,58E-23 
4,286 kW/m3 59,19 3 1 3 5 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 32,68 4 1 4 5 YES 
5 Storage Area V130 5 1,58E-23 
4,286 kW/m3 59,19 3 1 3 5 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 32,68 4 1 4 5 YES 
6 Storage Area V140 5 1,58E-23 
4,286 kW/m3 59,19 3 1 3 5 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 32,68 4 1 4 5 YES 
7 Storage Area System 6 1,67E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 59,19 3 1 3 5 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 32,68 4 1 4 5 YES 
8 Office and Control Room 5 1,58E-23 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
9 Warehouse 5 1,58E-23 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
10 Pump house 7 8,47E-11 
4,286 kW/m3 9,21 3 1 3 1 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 5,65 4 1 4 1 YES 
11 Powerhouse 6 1,67E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
12 Filling Shed 8 1,68E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 9,21 3 1 3 15 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 5,65 4 1 4 15 YES 
13 Skid Tank Parking Area 8 1,68E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
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Table 9.6. Risk Representation for Explosion 150 mm Leak Scenario 
Category: Explosion Bore Diameter 
150 mm 
                
                
No. Receiver 
Corresponding 
Node 
Frequencies 
Type of 
Consequences 
Radius (m) Severity Level 
Likelihood 
Level 
Risk Level 
No. Of People 
Affected 
Mitigation 
1 Jetty MLA 1 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
2 Metering Station 2 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
3 Storage Area V110 5 2,99E-22 
0,2 bar 99,25 1 1 1 5 NO 
1,3 bar 26,44 3 1 3 5 NO 
2,0 bar 20,68 4 1 4 0 NO 
4 Storage Area V120 5 2,99E-22 
0,2 bar 99,25 1 1 1 5 NO 
1,3 bar 26,44 3 1 3 5 NO 
2,0 bar 20,68 4 1 4 0 NO 
5 Storage Area V130 5 2,99E-22 
0,2 bar 99,25 1 1 1 5 NO 
1,3 bar 26,44 3 1 3 5 NO 
2,0 bar 20,68 4 1 4 0 NO 
6 Storage Area V140 5 2,99E-22 
0,2 bar 99,25 1 1 1 5 NO 
1,3 bar 26,44 3 1 3 5 NO 
2,0 bar 20,68 4 1 4 0 NO 
7 Storage Area System 6 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
8 Office and Control Room  5 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
9 Warehouse 5 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
10 Pump house 7 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
11 Powerhouse 6 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
12 Filling Shed 8 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
13 Skid Tank Parking Area 8 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
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CHAPTER 10 
MITIGATION AND PRE FIRE PLANNING 
 
10.1.  General 
The mitigation and pre fire planning is one effort to minimize the risk. On this 
thesis which fire hazard become concern one way to minimize the effect is by 
analyze the parametrics requirement to extinguish the fire that may occur. One 
fire hazard that become major concern is a Jet Fire since Jet Fire is one hazard 
that last longer than other fire hazard which only last few second. Another reason 
why Jet Fire is one of the major concern is that Jet Fire is the most appealing fire 
risk hazard that occur in most facility handling in hydrocarbon gases such as LPG. 
The process to analyze the requirement to extinguish the fire are to  calculate 
the possible outcome caused by Jet Fire such as: the heat flux, radiation zone, fire 
temperature, etc. The next step is to calculate extinguisher requirement based on 
the fire outcome. The detailed process of determining the pre fire planning are 
further will explained on this chapter. 
 
10.2.  Fire Fighting Specification of Terminal LPG Semarang 
 
 
Figure 10.1. Location of the Fire Extinguisher at Terminal LPG Semarang 
 
Terminal LPG Semarang is equiped with various apparatus to extinguish such 
as fire incident. In this subchapter will provide detailed information about 
Terminal LPG Semarang’s fire fighting facility. The brief data of the main 
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extinguisher can be seen on Table 10.1., meanwhile the detailed information of 
the fire extinguisher facility can be found on Appendix 3.  Besides analyze the 
requiement for fire extinguisher, Pre Fire Planning also analyze the reachability of 
the possible receiver with higher risk into a fire hose which can be seen on Figure 
10.1. 
 
10.3.  Calculation of Auxilliary Cooling for Storage Tank 
The regulation regarding the requirement for fire extinguising apparatus 
mainly comes from NFPA (National Fire Protection Agency) regulation. The 
auxilliary cooling has function as cooleing agent for storage tank in case one or 
more tanks is burnt, it will prevent the fire to affect another tank, and to prevent 
the escalation of the effect. For auxilliary cooling of storage tank the regulation 
is stated on NFPA 15: Standard for Water Spray Fixed System for Fire Protection. 
The NFPA 15 regulate the specific water spray system density over the area 
covered. The Table that regulate the specification of the spray stated on the Table 
7.4.3.4.3. NFPA 15 as can be seen on Table 10.1. 
 
Table 10.1. Density requirement for Fire Protection (NFPA, 2007) 
Number of 
Rack Levels 
Plan View Density at 
Lowest Level 
Plan View Density at 
Upper Level(s)* 
Levels 
Requiring 
Nozzels gpm/ft2 (L/min)/m2 gpm/ft2 (L/min)/m2 
1 0,25 10,2 N/A N/A All 
2 0,20 8,2 0,15 6,1 All 
3, 4, or 5 0,20 8,2 0,15 6,1 Alternate 
6 or more 0,20 8,2 0,10 4,1 Alternate 
*The table values contemplate exposure from spill fire. 
 
       From the Table above, since Terminal LPG Semarang has 6 rack of water 
spray it stated that the density requirement for storage tank of Terminal LPG 
Semarang are 0,20 gpm/ft2 or 8,2 (L/min)/m2.  
To calculate the total amount of the required capacity it need to be calculate 
the surface area of the storage tank. Since the storage tank at Terminal LPG 
Semarang with the diameter of 21,9 m, it can be determined using formula of 
spherical surface area which: 
𝐴 = 4 𝜋𝑟2                                  (10.1) 
Where: 
A = Surface area of Sphere 
r = radius of the sphere = 10,95 m 
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So,  it obtaiined that the surface area of the tank are: 
A = 4 . 3,14 . 10,952 
=1505,975 m2  
=16201,89 ft2 
From the surface area of the spherical tank surface area and the water density 
requirement now the capacity of the fire pump can be conducted. The capacity 
of the fire pump is considered to accomodate 4 (four) storage tanks.  
The total pump capacity to serve the storage tanks can be calculated by 
accumulate the total of surface area times with the water density requirement. 
 
Total Pump Capacity = Density Requirement . Surface area of the tank 
= 0,25 gpm/ft2 . 16201 ft2 
= 3240,377 gpm/tank 
 
From the requirement for each tank from the result it can obtain the 
requirement for each scenaio on which tank may burn and calculate the total 
requirement of the auxilliary cooling for each scenario. The typical occurence 
regarding the fire in the storage tank is that one tank burnt and makes another 
tank need auxilliary cooling as a prevention of the unburnt tank tonot occur a 
higher pressure caused by increasing of the temperature. 
Another think to consider during auxilliary cooling process is the compliance 
of the water supply. As in the Terminal LPG Semarang the water supply for fire 
extinguisher are internally supplied by water pond inside the terminal. In the 
NFPA 15 Chapter A.4.4.8. that it is the requirement for auxilliary cooling is atleast 
cover the operation for 4 (four) hours as the regulation stated: 
“It is desirable to contain runoff for the anticipated duration of any fire. 
However, in large chemical or petrochemical facilities, a major fire can last for 8 
hours or more, resulting in extremely large holding basins or retention ponds. 
Where the anticipated incident duration results in retention basins that are of 
impractical size, methods to limit the duration of runoff might be required. 
When an extended duration is anticipated, a duration of 4 hours is usually 
considered the practical maximum. During that time, it is often possible to isolate 
equipment and reduce the flow rate of water and other materials so that the 
continuous discharge flow rate is less than the initial flow rate. If a significant 
amount of flammable materials can be removed from the protected area, it could 
be possible to shut down water spray systems and manually fight the fire, greatly 
reducing the amount of material that needs to be contained (NFPA, 2007).“ 
Based on the requirement and calculation mentioned above the complete 
recapitulation for auxilliary cooling can be seen  on table 10.2.
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Table 10.2. Recapitulationi for Auxilliary Cooling Scenario 
No. Tank Identification Burnt Tank Scenario Diameter (m) Surface Area (m2) Auxiliary Cooling Requirement  
m ft. m2 ft2 gpm L/min 
1 V110  21,9 71,832 1505,975 16201,89 3240,377149 12264,82751 
2 V120   21,9 71,832 1505,975 16201,89 3240,377149 12264,82751 
3 V130   21,9 71,832 1505,975 16201,89 3240,377149 12264,82751 
4 V140   21,9 71,832 1505,975 16201,89 3240,377149 12264,82751 
       
Total 12961,50859 49059,31003 
 
Based on calculation above the compliance of the Terminal facility to overcome the requirement can be seen on 
Table 10.3. below. 
 
Table 10.3. Compliance the Parametric Requirement against Existing Facility 
No Description Requirement Existing Facility Unit Status 
1 Minimum Pump Req. 12961,50859 4 x 3000 gpm Comply 
2 Water supply for 4 
hours 
11774,23441 7825 m3 Not Comply 
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10.4.  Calculation of Fixed Fire Extinguisher at High Risk Receiver 
Based on the risk representation there are appeal to be several receiver has 
higher level of fire risk. On this subchapter will conduct the calculation of the 
required parameter to extinugish the corresponding effect caused by the fire. It 
stated on the beginning of this chapter the major concern of fire hazard is that 
Jet Fire, since Jet Fire appears to have higher escalation effect and occur in most 
longer period of occurence. To calculate the required amount of water as fire 
extinguisher the step will be explained in the following subchapter. 
 
10.4.1. Calculation of Gas Release Rate 
The gas released from the orifice are calculated based on the DNV Failure 
Frequency method as already explained in the Equation 7.1. The orifice to be 
considered is only the higher values which is 150 mm diameter. This 
consideration is assumed because if the facility can overcome the worst scenario 
it should be able to overcome less fatal scenarios. The formula to calculate 150 
mm leak can be seen below: 
𝑄𝑔 = 1,4 𝑥 10−2 . 𝑑2. √𝜌𝑔𝑃𝑔  (7.2) (DNV, 2014) 
Where: 
Qg : initial gas release rate (kg/s) 
ρg : initial density of gas (kg/m
2) 
Pg : initial pressure of gas (bar gauge) 
d : diameter of the hole 
 
So, the gas release rate are: 
 
𝑄𝑔 = 1,4 𝑥 10−2 . 𝑑2. √𝜌𝑔𝑃𝑔 
𝑄𝑔 = 1,4 𝑥 10−2 . 1502. √0,62 . 13,4  
Qg = 25,22 kg/s 
 
10.4.2. Calculation of Jet Fire Heat Release 
To calculate the heat amount of Jet Fire, assumed that the mass of gas relased 
is burnt completely, consider the Net Calorific Value of LPG is 10.997 kcal/kg and 
converted into kJ the heat released by Jet Fire is shown on calculation below: 
 
Q = NCVLPG  .  4,18 / 1000 
=10.997 . 4,18  / 1000 
= 1159,3 kW = 1097,86 btu/s 
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10.4.3. Calculation of Fire Temperature 
To determine the fire temperature the formula is derrived from SPFE 
Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering. The formula to calculate the 
temperature is shown below: 
                                                                                       
   (10.2) (SPFE, 2016) 
 
 
Where, 
To= plume centerline temperature (°C) 
Qc = convective portion of the heat release rate (kW) 
Ta = ambient air temperature (K) 
g = acceleration of gravity (m/sec2) 
cp = specific heat of air (kJ/kg-K) 
ra = ambient air density (kg/m3) 
z = distance from the top of the fuel package to the ceiling (m) 
z0 = hypothetical virtual origin of the fire (m) 
 
Based on the formula above figured out the temperature of the fire is 578,513 
°C 
 
10.4.4. Calculation of Water Absorpent Requirement 
The required water absorpent to extinguish the fire are calculated using the 
following formula: 
𝑄 = 𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 (𝑔) .  ∆𝑇 .  𝐶𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟                      (10.3) 
 
So to calculate the mass of water: 
𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 =  
𝑄
∆𝑇 .  𝐶𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟
 
Where: 
∆𝑇 = The initial Fire Temperature – Auto ignite temperature of LPG 
(405 °C, to be taken at 400 °C)  
Q  = Heat Released from Jet Fire (400 kW (taken from consequences 
modelling)) 
CWater  = Specific heat absorpent of water (4,184 J/kg°C) 
 
From the  equation above it can be concluded the various water requirment 
on various receiver based on each receiver specification. The recapitulation of 
water requirement for extinguish the fire at Storage Tank can be seen on Table 
10.4. below.
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Table 10.4. Fire Extinguishing Requirement for Storage Tank 
Fire Extinguisher requirement for 
Storage Tank with 150 mm leak 
Jet Fire Scenario 
                   
                   
No. Tank Identification Diameter (m) Surface Area (m2) Tank Volume (MT) Jet Fire 
Diameter (m) 
(From 
Consequences 
Modelling) 
Jet Fire Release Rate* Jet Fire 
Emissivity 
Power 
kW/m2** 
Flame 
Temperature 
(degC)*** 
Water Heat Absorption 
Requirement **** 
Water 
Supply 
Requirement 
4 Hours 
(m3) 
m ft m2 ft2 kW  btu/s lpm gpm 
1 V110 21,9 71,832 1505,975 16201,89 2500 96 1159,299 1097,856 400 578,5134275 1552,147624 403,5583823 372,5154299 
2 V120 21,9 71,832 1505,975 16201,89 2500 96 1159,299 1097,856 400 578,5134275 1552,147624 403,5583823 372,5154299 
3 V130 21,9 71,832 1505,975 16201,89 2500 96 1159,299 1097,856 400 578,5134275 1552,147624 403,5583823 372,5154299 
4 V140 21,9 71,832 1505,975 16201,89 2500 96 1159,299 1097,856 400 578,5134275 1552,147624 403,5583823 372,5154299 
 
Table 10.5. Fire Extinguishing Requiremnt for Jetty Area and MLA 
Fire Extinguisher of Jetty Area and 
MLA for Leak 150 mm Jet Fire 
Scenario  
               
               
No Pipe Diameter (inch)  Release Rate (kg/s) Jet Fire Diameter (m) 
(From Consequences 
Modelling) 
Jet Fire Release Rate* Jet Fire 
Emissivity 
Power 
kW/m2** 
Flame 
Temperature 
(degC)*** 
Water Heat Absorption 
Requirement **** 
Water Supply 
Requirement 4 
Hours (m3) kW  btu/s lpm gpm 
1 10 25,22 94 1159,299 1097,856 400 578,524965 1552,047314 403,5323016 372,4913553 
 
Table 10.6. Fire Extinguishing Requirement for Meterring Station  
Fire Extinguisher of Metering 
Station  for Leak 150 mm Jet Fire 
Scenario  
               
               
No Pipe Diameter (inch)  Release Rate (kg/s) Jet Fire Diameter 
(m) (From 
Consequences 
Modelling) 
Jet Fire Release Rate* Jet Fire 
Emissivity 
Power 
kW/m2** 
Flame 
Temperature 
(degC)*** 
Water Heat Absorption 
Requirement **** 
Water Supply 
Requirement 4 
Hours (m3) kW  btu/s lpm gpm 
1 10 25,22 94 1159,299 1097,856 400 578,524965 1552,047314 403,5323016 372,4913553 
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Table 10.7 Fire Extinguishing Requirement for Pumphouse 
Fire Extinguisher of Pump 
house for Leak 150 mm Jet 
Fire Scenario  
               
               
No Pipe Diameter (inch)  Release Rate (kg/s) Jet Fire 
Diameter (m) 
(From 
Consequences 
Modelling) 
Jet Fire Release Rate* Jet Fire 
Emissivity 
Power 
kW/m2** 
Flame 
Temperature 
(degC)*** 
Water Heat Absorption 
Requirement **** 
Water Supply 
Requirement 
4 Hours (m3) kW  btu/s lpm gpm 
1 6 25,22 105,81 1159,299 1097,856 400 578,4623392 1552,591957 403,6739087 372,6220696 
 
Table 10.8. Fire Extinguishing Requirement for Filling Shed 
Fire Extinguisher of Filling Shed for Leak 150 mm Jet 
Fire Scenario  
               
               
No Pipe Diameter (inch)  Release Rate 
(kg/s) 
Jet Fire 
Diameter 
(m) (From 
Consequen
ces 
Modelling) 
Jet Fire Release 
Rate* 
Jet Fire 
Emissivi
ty 
Power 
kW/m2*
* 
Flame 
Temperatu
re 
(degC)*** 
Water Heat 
Absorption 
Requirement **** 
Water 
Supply 
Requireme
nt 4 Hours 
(m3) 
kW  btu/s lpm gpm 
1 3 25,22 104,7 1159,2
99 
1097,8
56 
400 578,467699
2 
1552,5453
27 
403,6617
85 
372,610878
5 
99 
 
 
 
10.4.5. Determination of Compliance and Reachability of Fire 
Extinguisher 
From the calculation of fire extinguisher requiremnt on the previous 
subchapter it need to be analyze wether the existing facility can overcome or not. 
The compliance is not only the required capacity and water supply but also the 
reachability aspect of the fire extinguishing facility. The complete analysis of the 
compliance and the reachability aspect can be seen on the Table below. The 
scope of aspect that become consideration at determine wheter the aspect 
comply or not  are as follows:  
1. Pump Capacity Requirement 
2. Water supply avaibility for atleats 4 (four) hours of fire extinguishing 
3. Water Nozzle Specification 
4. Reachability from nearest water hose 
Various aspect will be determine which aspect at Terminal LPG Semarang that 
probably not comply to overcome certain scenarios. One thing to consider the 
calculations are based on the worst case scenario which. It is privilege to Terminal 
LPG Semarang to determine wheteher the worst case scenario is as their point of 
view or not since the occurence of the worst case scenario may less likely to occur. 
 
10.1.  Fire Risk Card  
Based on the analysisi on the previous chapter the result can be determined 
as baseline to conduct the fire risk card to suggest Terminal LPG Semarang as 
their platform to determine actions durig fire incident. The Fire risk card contains 
summarize of the required amount of the fire extinguisher requirement. The 
example of the Fire Risk Card can be seen on the Table 10.9. The complete 
recapitulation of Fire Risk Card can be found on Appendix 8. 
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Table 10.7. Compliance and Reachability of Jetty Area and MLA 
Compliance and Reachability of Fire Extinguisher at 
Jetty and MLA area 
                
                
No Location Pump Capacity (gpm) Water Nozzle Water Supply for 4 (four) hours Reachability From Nearest Hose Status 
Requirement Existing Requirement Existing Requirement Existing Location Reachability 
1 Jetty and MLA 403,5583823 1000 403,5583823 800 372,5154299 Unlimited (sea 
water) 
Independent on Jetty 
Area 
Reachable OK 
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Table 10.8. Compliance and Reachability at Various High Risk Area  
Compliance and 
Reachability of Fire 
Extinguisher at High Risk 
Area 
                
                
No Location Pump Capacity (gpm) Water Nozzle Water Supply for 4 (four) hours (m3) Reachability From Nearest Hose Status 
Requirement Existing Requirement Existing Requirement Existing Location Reachability 
1 Storage Tank   4 x 3000 4 x 379,1610002 8 x 800 & 2 x 275   7825 Dedicated for Storage 
Tank 1 each storage 
Tank 
Reachable OK 
V110 403,5583823 372,5154299 
V120 403,5583823 372,5154299 
V130 403,5583823 372,5154299 
V140 403,5583823 372,5154299 
Total 1614,233529 1490,061719 
2 Metering Station 403,5323016 4 x 3000 1 x 379,1610002 8 x 800 & 2 x 275 372,4913553 7825 Dedicated for 
metering station and 
fire pump area 
Reachable OK 
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3 Pump house  403,6739087 4 x 3000 1 x 379,1610002 8 x 800 & 2 x 275 403,6739087 7825 No dedicated hose 
for pump house area, 
only portable fire 
extinguisher 
Not reachable Considerable 
4 Filling Shed Area 403,661785 4 x 3000 1 x 379,1610002 8 x 800 & 2 x 275 372,6108785 7825 Dedicated for filling 
shed area 2 @each 
side 
Reachable OK 
Continued from previous Table 
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Table 10.9. Fire Risk Card of Terminal LPG Semarang 
Fire Risk Card Terminal LPG Semarang 
Incident Scenario:             
Storage tank V110 encounter 150 mm leak and the gas released become jet fire, 
and Storage Tank V120, V130, V140 in need of auxiliary cooling 
Hazard       Location Description     
Flame Emissivity : 400 kw/m2 Storage V110    
Heat Flux Radiation Zone (m)        
  25 kw/m2 : 82,59       
  35 kw/m2 : 57,13       
  45 kw/m2 : 35,82       
                
Facility Information        
Type of Facility : Storage Tank     
Size  : -      
Capacity  : 2500 MT     
Surface Area        
(for Storage Tank) : 1505,975 m2     
                
Auxiliary Cooling Requirement           
Burnt Tank : V110      
Tank to be         
cooled down : V120, V130, V140     
Pump flow rate        
Requirement : 9721,131 gpm     
Water supply for        
for auxiliary cooling : 8830,676 m3     
                
Minimum Fire Extinguisher Requirement         
Fire Pump flow rate : 403,5584 gpm     
Fire Hose flow rate : 403,5584 gpm     
Water Supply        
for 4 (four) hours : 372,5154 m3     
          
Note               
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSSION AND SUGGESTION 
 
11.1.  Conclussion 
Based on the Fire Risk Assessment of Termina; LPG Semarang it concluded 
that: 
1. Based on Hazard Identification the fire hazard such as Jet Fire, Flash Fire 
and Explosion occur when the components suffer failures that lead into 
leaks or gas released then ignited, therefore the major cause that lead 
into release are: high pressure in the system, blockage in the system, high 
temperature, and too much flow rate. 
2. On the frequency analysis the approach is to analysze the system failure 
frequecncy, it makes the result are dependent based on the how system 
work, the result is vary, the lowest frequency comes in system that 
involving storage. 
3. During the Consequences Analysis the highest source of the 
consequences are caused by the Storage tank since the storage tank 
containts the most amount of LPG and has the highest working pressure. 
4. The result of risk representation often lead to conclusion that even the 
lowest frequency can caused the most effect in consequences. The risk 
representation also reveal that the most likely occurence in this researh 
still located on the rare area of the likelihood classification on Company 
Risk Matrix. The process of risk representation also reveal because in the 
severity only describe the individual severity and not operational activity 
the potential loss is only represent the loss of individual and not seeing it 
through operational or assets loss.  
5. The Pre Fire Planing mitigation process conclude that several facility in 
Terminal LPG Semarang still not comply the minimum requirement to 
overcome the worst case scenario of fire incident. 
6. The analysis of Pre Fire Planning reveal that improvemet on the facility is 
required eventhough not major evaluations needed. 
 
11.2.  Sugestion 
1. As the Pre Fire Planning sugest Terminal LPG Semarang to increase water 
Pond capacity by at least 4.000 m3 
2. The risk matrix used by company not quantitively well describe the 
likelihood that creates most of likelihood/frequency appear to be rare. In 
the future it may become object to be revised. 
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3. The assessment regarding fire incident in the Terminal LPG Semarang 
should be followed up by drilling practice so that every incident can be 
overcome. 
4. During operational activity Terminal LPG Semarang is suggested that the 
clear standard operational procedure is strcitly applied so that any 
operational failure leading into potential hazard can be reduced. 
5. As this research not assess from the design point of view of fire 
extinguishing of Terminal LPG Semarang the further research can be 
initiated to assess wheter all the Fire Extinguishing facility of Terminal LPG 
Semarang are fully comply with considered Regulation or not regarding 
the corresponding standard.
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Appendix 1: Terminal Layout 
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Appendix 2: Terminal System P&ID 
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Appendix 3: Terminal Fire Fighting Arrangement 
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HSE FACILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE DATA 
 
 
TERMINAL LPG SEMARANG  
          
 
Checked: 31 January 2017      No. : TLS-80-SF-012-XIV  
No. Type of Facility Description 
 
 
I. Protection and Fire 
Extinguisher 
        
  
         
1,1 Fire Extinguisher Pumps  
Unit Qty Brand Pump Type  Engine Brand Mover Notes 
 
  a. Fixed Fire Pump 
 
    Cap   @3000 GPM  
Unit 4 
Amarillo Vertikal Clarke Diesel  Proper Condition 
 
     Amarillo Verticals Clarke Diesel  Proper Condition 
 
     Amarillo Verticals Clarke Diesel  Proper Condition 
 
   
 
Amarillo Verticals Clarke Diesel  Proper Condition 
 
  b. Jockey Pump               
 
    Cap. 13.51 GPM Unit 2 
Grunfos Verticals - Electric Proper Condition 
 
   Mufitec Verticals - Electric Proper Condition 
 
  c. Fixe Fire Pump Jetty                
 
    Cap  1000 GPM Unit 1 Amarillo Verticals Clarke Diesel  Proper Condition 
 
1,2 Water Supply Unit Qty Capacity Dimension Notes 
 
  a. Water Pond Unit 1 7825 M³ 111x30x2.35 Proper Condition 
    
  
  Unit            
  b. Shallow well   3 Flow rate   Infiltration Well 
 
          Flow rate         
 
1,3 Fire extinguisher Distribution Apparatus 
Unit Length  ∑ Block Valve Valve Type Notes 
 
  a. Fire Extinguisher Pipe 
 
  
 > Ø  1 1/2 Inchi Meter 14     Proper Condition      
  
 > Ø  2 Inchi Meter 42     Proper Condition     
  
 > Ø  4 Inchi Meter 128     Proper Condition     
  
 > Ø  6 Inchi Meter 471 6 gate valve Proper Condition     
  
 > Ø  8 Inchi Meter 5     Proper Condition     
  
 > Ø 10 Inchi Meter 48 8 gate valve Proper Condition     
  
 > Ø 12 Inchi Meter 48     Proper Condition     
  
 > Ø 16 Inchi Meter 304     Proper Condition     
  
 > Ø 20 Inchi Meter 84 1 BV Proper Condition     
  b. Fire Hydrant Unit Qty Brand Coupling Type Notes 
 
  
 > Fire Hydrant Double (Ø2½" x 2) Unit 8 Gunebo Machino Proper Condition 
    
  
  Unit       
     
  
 > Fire Hydrant Single (Ø2½" x 1) Unit       
     
  c. Hose Box Unit 8 Gunebo Machino Proper Condition     
 
  d. Water Sprinkler Satuan Jumlah Type Ø Pipe & ∑Nozzle Cap. Nozzle Notes 
 
  
 Tank V-110 Unit 2 Deluge Valve  Ø 2   Cap  2500 MT   
 
  
 Tank V-120 Unit 2 Deluge Valve  Ø 2   Cap  2500 MT   
 
  
 Tank V-130 Unit 2 Deluge Valve  Ø 2    Cap  2500 MT   
 
  
 Tank V-140 Unit 2 Deluge Valve  Ø 2   Cap  2500 MT   
 
  e. Fire hose Total Brand Coupling Type Notes 
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 > Canvas Hose Unit Field Warehouse 
 
  
 - Ø 2 ½ Inchi Length   8 Germany Machino Proper Condition 
 
  
 - Ø 1 ½ Inchi Length - -     
    
  
 > Rubber Hose Length 8 10 Germany Machino Proper Condition   
 
  
 - Ø 2 ½ Inchi Length 30 m 18 Germany Machino Proper Condition 10 kondisi baru 
 
  
 - Ø 1 ½ Inch Length 30 m 9 Germany Machino Proper Condition   
 
  f. Portable Suction Hose Unit Field Warehouse Brand Coupling Type Notes 
 
  
 - Ø 6 Inchi Length - 1   Chicago New   
 
  
 - Ø 4 Inchi Length - 3   Threeded New   
 
  
 - Ø 3 Inchi Length         
    
  g. Water Nozzle Unit Field Warehouse Brand Capacity Notes 
 
  
  Jet - Spay Nozzle 2,5 Inchi Pcs 8 6 Elkhart-Akron 800 LPM 
 Proper Condition 
  
  Jet - Spay Nozzle 1,5 Inchi  Pcs 6   Akron 275 LPM Proper Condition 
 
  
 Incalating Fix Monitor Pcs   1 Ozzie 800 LPM 
 New Condition  
  
 Jet Nozzle 2.5 Inchi Pcs 1   Elkhart   
 Proper Condition  
  h. Fix Ground Monitor Unit 16   Gunebo   
 Proper Conition  
  i. Portable Fire Pump Unit 3   Tohatsu 172 GPM V20D2S New Condition 
 
  j Portable Fire Pump Unit 1   Lambordini 500 GPM 
 New Condition  
  k. Wat " R " wall Pcs 4   Gunebo   
 Proper Condition  
  l. Hose Accessories Unit Field Warehouse Brand Coupling Type Notes 
 
  
 > Y - Piece 2 x Ø1½" x Ø2½" Pcs 8     Machino 2 New Condition 2 Broke  
 
  
 > Collecting 2 x Ø2½" x Ø4" Pcs         
    
  
 > Reducer Ø2½" to Ø1½" Pcs         
    
  
 > Female to Male Ø2½" to Ø2½" Pcs 8 7 Unidur Machino Proper Condition 
 
  
 > Female to Male Ø1½" to Ø1½" Pcs 6 3 Unidur Machino Kondisi layak 
 
  
 > Female to Famele Ø2½" to Ø2½" Pcs   3 Kanvas Machino Kondisi Layak 
 
  
 > Female to Famele Ø1½" to Ø1½" Pcs         
    
  
 > Male to Male Ø2½" to Ø2½" Pcs         
    
  
 > Male to Male Ø1½" to Ø1½" Pcs         
    
  
 > Spaner Pcs         
    
    > Valve fastener Pcs 8     Gunebo   Proper Conditioni 
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Appendix 4: Node Classsification 
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Appendix 5: Fault Tree Result 
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FTA Result of Node 1 Bore Size Diameter 1-3 mm 
 
 
 
FTA Result of Node 1 Bore Size Diameter 3-10 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 1 Bore Size Diameter 10-50 mm 
 
 
FTA Result of Node 1 Bore Size Diameter 50-150 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 1 Bore Size Diameter >150 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 2 Bore Size Diameter 1-3 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 2 Bore Size Diameter 3-10 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 2 Bore Size Diameter 10-50 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 2 Bore Size Diameter 50-150 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 2 Bore Size Diameter >150 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 3 Diameter 1-3 mm 
 
 
 
FTA Result of Node 3 Diameter 3-10 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 3 Bore Size Diameter 10-50 mm 
 
 
 
 
Result of Node 3 Bore Size Diameter 50-150 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 4 Bore Size Diameter 1-3 mm 
 
 
FTA Result of Node 4 Bore Size Diameter 3-10 mm   
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FTA Result of Node 4 Bore Size Diameter 10-50 mm  
 
 
FTA Result of Node 4 Bore Size Diameter 50-150 mm   
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FTA Result of Node 5 Bore Size Diameter 1-3 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 5 Bore Size Diameter 3-10 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 5 Bore Size Diameter 10-50 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 5 Bore Size Diameter 50-150 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 5 Bore Size Diameter >150 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 6: Distribution Bore Size Diameter 1-3 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 6: Distribution Bore Size Diameter 3-10 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 6: Distribution Bore Size Diameter 10-50 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 6: Distribution Bore Size Diameter 50-150 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 6: Reciving Bore Size Diameter 1-3 mm 
 
 
 
FTA Result of Node 6: Reciving Bore Size Diameter 3-10 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 6: Reciving Bore Size Diameter 10-50 mm 
 
 
 
FTA Result of Node 6: Reciving Bore Size Diameter 50-150 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 6: Reciving Bore Size Diameter >150 mm 
 
 
 
  
  
157 
 
 
  
158 
 
 
 
FTA Result of Node 7 Bore Size Diameter 1-3 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 7 Bore Size Diameter 3-10 mm 
160 
 
 
 
FTA Result of Node 7 Bore Size Diameter 10-50 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 7 Bore Size Diameter 50-150 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 7 Bore Size Diameter >150 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 8 Bore Size Diameter 1-3 mm 
 
 
 
FTA Result of Node 8 Bore Size Diameter 3-10 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 8 Bore Size Diameter 10-50 mm 
 
 
 
FTA Result of Node 8 Bore Size Diameter 50-150 mm 
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FTA Result of Node 8 Bore Size Diameter >150 mm 
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Appendix 5: Event Tree Result 
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0,889
0,001
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
1,16E-7
1,27E-5
1,03E-4
1,16E-4
 
 
Event Tree of Node 1 Bore Size 1-3 mm 
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0,889
0,001
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
4,49E-7
4,94E-5
4,00E-4
4,49E-4
 
 
 
Event Tree of Node 1 Bore Size 3-10 mm   
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0,88753
0,00247
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
3,71E-7
1,65E-5
1,33E-4
1,50E-4
 
 
Event Tree of Node 1 Bore Size 10-50 mm   
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0,88753
0,00247
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
3,71E-7
1,65E-5
1,33E-4
1,50E-4
 
  
Event Tree of Node 1 Bore Size 50-150 mm 
 
  
  
173 
 
 
 
0,87149
0,01851
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
4,60E-7
2,74E-6
2,17E-5
2,49E-5
 
 
Event Tree of Node 1 Bore Size >150 mm 
 
  
174 
 
 
 
0,889
0.001
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
1,17E-7
1,29E-5
1,04E-4
1,17E-4
 
 
Event Tree of Node 2 Bore Size 1-3 mm 
  
  
175 
 
 
0,889
0,001
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
5,02E-7
5,52E-5
4,46E-4
5,02E-4
 
 
Event Tree of Node 2 Bore Size 3-10 mm 
  
176 
 
 
 
0,88753
0,00247
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
4,27E-7
1,90E-5
1,53E-4
1,73E-4
 
 
Event Tree of Node 2 Bore Size 10-50 mm 
 
  
  
177 
 
 
0,87149
0,01851
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
5,52E-7
3,28E-6
2,60E-5
2,98E-5
 
 
Event Tree of Node 2 Bore Size 50-150 mm 
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0,81935
0,07065
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
2,80E-6
4,36E-6
3,25E-5
3,97E-5
 
 
Event Tree of Node 2 Bore Size >150 mm 
 
 
  
  
179 
 
 
0,889
0,001
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
6,18E-7
6,79E-5
5,49E-4
6,18E-4
 
 
Event Tree of Node 3 Bore Size 1-3 mm   
180 
 
 
 
 
0,889
0,001
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
5,80E-7
6,38E-5
5,16E-4
5,80E-4
 
Event Tree of Node 3 Bore Size 3-10 mm   
  
181 
 
 
 
0,88753
0,00247
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
2,56E-7
1,14E-5
9,20E-5
1,04E-4
 
Tree of Node 3 Bore Size 10-50 mm 
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0,87149
0,01851
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
9,42E-7
5,6E-6
4,43E-5
5,09E-5
 
 
Event Tree of Node 3 Bore Size 50-150 mm 
  
  
183 
 
 
0,889
0,001
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
5,56E-7
6,11E-5
4,94E-4
5,56E-4
 
 
Event Tree of Node 4 Bore Size 1-3 mm   
184 
 
 
 
 
0,889
0,001
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
5,25E-7
5,78E-5
4,67E-4
5,25E-4
 
Event Tree of Node 4 Bore Size 3-10 mm   
  
185 
 
 
 
0,88753
0,00247
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
1,31E-7
5,82E-6
4,70E-5
5,29E-5
 
 
Event Tree of Node 4 Bore Size 10-50 mm   
186 
 
 
 
 
0,87149
0,01851
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
5,67E-7
3,37E-6
2,67E-5
3,06
 
Event Tree of Node 4 Bore Size 50-150 mm   
  
187 
 
 
0,889
0,01
0,11
Jet Fire
0,05
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
Storage Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
3,59E-18
1,97E-17
3,19E-15
3,59E-15
0,95 3,75E-16
Flash Fire
Explossion
 
 
Event Tree of Node 5 Bore Size 1-3 mm   
188 
 
 
 
0,889
0,001
0,11
Jet Fire
0,05
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
Storage Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
1,36E-17
7,45E-17
1,20E-14
1,36E-14
0,95 1,42E-15
Flash Fire
Explossion
 
 
Event Tree of Node 5 Bore Size 3-10 mm   
  
189 
 
0,88753
0,00247
0,11
Jet Fire
0,05
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
Storage Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
3,38E-19
7,51E-19
1,21E-16
1,37E-16
0,95 1,43E-17
Flash Fire
Explossion
 
Event Tree of Node 5 Bore Size 10-50 mm   
190 
 
 
 
0,87149
0,01851
0,11
Jet Fire
0,05
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
Storage Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
5,30E-23
1,58E-23
2,50E-21
2,87E-21
0,95 2,99E-22
Flash Fire
Explossion
 
 
Event Tree of Node 5 Bore Size 50-150 mm 
 
  
  
191 
 
0,81935
0,07065
0,11
Jet Fire
0,05
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
Storage Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
3,45E-27
2,68E-28
4,00E-26
4,88E-26
0,95 5,10E-27
Flash Fire
Explossion
 
Event Tree of Node 5 Bore Size >150 mm 
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0,889
0,001
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
2,94E-17
3,23E-15
2,61E-14
2,94E-14
 
Event Tree of Node 6: Distrbution Bore Size 1-3 mm 
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0,889
0,001
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
1,12E-18
1,23E-16
9,97E-16
1,12E-15
 
Event Tree of Node 6: Distrbution Bore Size 3-10 mm 
194 
 
 
0,88753
0,00247
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
1,17E-19
5,22E-18
4,21E-17
4,75E-17
 
Event Tree of Node 6: Distrbution Bore Size 10-50 mm 
  
195 
 
0,8749
0,01851
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
2,57E-21
1,53E-20
1,21E-19
1,39E-19
 
Event Tree of Node 6: Distrbution Bore Size 50-150 mm 
196 
 
 
0,81935
0,07065
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
3,13E-20
4,87E-20
3,63E-19
4,43E-19
 
Event Tree of Node 6: Distrbution Bore Size >150 mm 
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0,889
0,001
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
4,95E-7
5,45E-5
4,40E-4
4,95E-4
 
Event Tree of Node 6: Receiving Bore Size 1-3 mm 
198 
 
 
0,889
0,001
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
1,17E-6
1,29E-4
1,04E-3
1,17E-3
 
Event Tree of Node 6: Receiving Bore Size 3-10 mm 
  
199 
 
0,88753
0,00247
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
1,26E-6
5,60E-5
4,52E-4
5,09E-4
 
Event Tree of Node 6: Receiving Bore Size 10-50 mm 
200 
 
 
0,87149
0,01851
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
2,80E-6
1,67E-5
1,32E-4
1,51E-4
 
Event Tree of Node 6: Receiving Bore Size 50-150 mm 
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0,81935
0,07065
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
4,66E-6
7,25E-6
5,40E-5
6,59E-5
 
 
Event Tree of Node 6: Receiving Bore Size >150 mm 
 
 
 
  
202 
 
 
0,889
0,001
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
4,73E-13
5,20E-11
4,20E-10
4,73E-10
 
Event Tree of Node 7 Bore Size 1-3 mm 
  
203 
 
0,889
0,001
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
9,38E-14
1,03E-11
8,33E-11
9,38E-11
 
Event Tree of Node 7 Bore Size 3-10 mm 
 
204 
 
 
0,88753
0,00247
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
1,70E-16
7,55E-15
6,09E-14
6,86E-14
 
Event Tree of Node 7 Bore Size 10-50 mm 
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0,87149
0,01851
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
1,42E-11
8,47E-11
6,71E-10
7,70E-10
 
Event Tree of Node 7 Bore Size 50-150 mm 
 
206 
 
 
0,81935
0,07065
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
3,11E-19
4,84E-19
3,61E-18
4,40E-18
 
Event Tree of Node 7 Bore Size >150 mm 
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0,889
0,001
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
3,32E-6
3,65E-4
2,95E-3
3,32E-3
 
Event Tree of Node 8 Bore Size 1-3 mm 
208 
 
 
0,889
0.001
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
1,63E-6
1,79E-4
1,45E-3
1,63E-3
 
Event Tree of Node 8 Bore Size 3-10 mm 
  
209 
 
0,88753
0,0247
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
7,66E-7
3,41E-5
2,75E-4
3,10E-4
 
Event Tree of Node 8 Bore Size 10-50 mm 
210 
 
 
0,87149
0,001851
0,11
Jet Fire
Flash Fire
Gas Dispersion
No Ignition
Immidiate Ignition
Delayed Ignition
System Pipeline Release 
Frequency Ignition Outcome Frequency
2,83E-6
1,68E-5
1,33E-4
1,53E-4
 
Event Tree of Node 8 Bore Size 50-150 mm
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Appendix 6: Consequences Modelling Result 
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ATTACHMENT 
Consequences Modelling Result 
Legend 
1. Heat Intensity Radiation Area for Jet Fire 
 
                      25 kW/m2  
  35 kW/m2 
45 kW/m2 
 
2. Flash Fire Envlope 
                      4,286058 kW/m3 
   9,107874 kW/m3 
 
 
3. Explosion Pressure 
                      0,2 bar  
  1,3 bar 
  2,0 bar 
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 Leak 3 mm (MLA & Jetty) 
Jet Fire 
- 
Flash Fire 
 
 
 Leak 10 mm (MLA & Jetty) 
Jet Fire 
 
Flash Fire 
0,000 0,006 0,012
km
0,000 0,008 0,016
km
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 Leak 50 mm (MLA & Jetty) 
Jet Fire 
 
Flash Fire 
0,000 0,010 0,020
km
0,00 0,02 0,04
km
216 
 
 
 
 
 Leak 150 mm (MLA & Jetty) 
Jet Fire 
 
Flash Fire 
0,00 0,02
km
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
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 Leak 3 mm (Meterring Station) 
Jet Fire  
- 
Flah Fire 
 
 
 Leak 10 mm (Meterring Station) 
Jet Fire 
0,000 0,010 0,020
km
0,000 0,008 0,016
km
218 
 
 
 
Flash Fire 
 
 
 Leak 50 mm (Meterring Station) 
Jet Fire 
0,00 0,02
km
0,000 0,010 0,020
km
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Flash Fire 
 
 
 Leak 150 mm (Meterring Station) 
Jet Fire  
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
0,00 0,02 0,04
km
220 
 
 
 
Flash Fire 
 
 Leak 3 mm (Storage V110) 
Jet Fire 
- 
Flash Fire 
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
0,00 0,02
km
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Explosion 
 
 
 Leak 10 mm (Storage V110) 
Jet Fire 
0,000 0,010 0,020
km
0,00 0,02 0,04
km
222 
 
 
 
Flash Fire 
 
Explosion 
 
 
 Leak 50 mm (Storage V110) 
0,000 0,008 0,016
km
0,00 0,02
km
0,00 0,02 0,04
km
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Jet Fire 
 
Flash Fire 
 
Explosion 
 
 
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
0,00 0,02 0,04
km
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
224 
 
 
 Leak 150 mm (Storage V110) 
Jet Fire 
 
Flash Fire 
 
Explosion 
0,00 0,04 0,08
km
0,00 0,04 0,08
km
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 3 mm Leak (Storage V120) 
Jet Fire 
- 
Flash Fire 
 
Explosion 
0,00 0,04 0,08
km
0,00 0,02
km
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 Leak 10 mm (Storage V120) 
Jet Fire 
 
Flash Fire 
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
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Explosion 
 
 
 Leak 50 mm (Storage V120) 
Jet Fire 
0,00 0,02 0,04
km
0,00 0,02
km
228 
 
 
 
Flash Fire 
 
Explosion 
 
 
 Leak 150 mm (Storage V120) 
0,00 0,02 0,04
km
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
0,00 0,04 0,08
km
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Jet Fire 
 
Flash Fire 
 
Explosion 
 
 
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
0,00 0,04 0,08
km
0,00 0,04 0,08
km
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 Leak 3 mm (Storage V130) 
Jet Fire 
- 
Flash Fire 
 
Explosion 
 
 
 Leak 10 mm (Storage V130) 
Jet Fire 
0,00 0,02
km
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
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Flash Fire 
 
Explosion 
 
 
 Leak 50 mm (Storage V130) 
0,00 0,02
km
0,00 0,02 0,04
km
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
232 
 
 
Jet Fire 
 
Flash Fire 
 
 
Explosion 
 
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
0,00 0,02 0,04
km
0,00 0,04 0,08
km
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 Leak 150 mm 
Jet Fire 
 
Flash Fire 
 
Explosion 
0,00 0,04 0,08
km
0,00 0,04 0,08
km
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 Leak 3 mm (Storage V140) 
Jet Fire 
- 
Flash Fire 
 
Explosion 
0,00 0,04 0,08
km
0,000 0,010 0,020
km
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 Leak 10 mm (Storage V140) 
Jet Fire 
 
Flash Fire 
0,00 0,02 0,04
km
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
236 
 
 
 
Explosion 
 
 
 
 Leak 50 mm (Storage V140) 
Jet Fire 
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
  
237 
 
 
Flash Fire 
 
Explosion 
 
 
 Leak 150 mm (Storage V140) 
0,00 0,04 0,08
km
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
0,00 0,04 0,08
km
238 
 
 
Jet Fire 
 
Flash Fire 
 
Explosion 
 
 
0,00 0,04 0,08
km
0,00 0,04 0,08
km
0,00 0,04 0,08
km
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 Leak 3 mm (Pump House) 
Jet Fire 
- 
Flash Fire 
 
Explosion 
- 
 
 Leak 10 mm (Pump House) 
Jet Fire 
 
Flash Fire 
0,000 0,010 0,020
km
0,00 0,02
km
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 Leak 50 mm (Pump House) 
Jet Fire 
 
Flash Fire 
0,000 0,008 0,016
km
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
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 Leak 150 mm (Pump House) 
Jet Fire 
 
Flash Fire 
0,000 0,010 0,020
km
0,00 0,04 0,08
km
242 
 
 
 
 
 Leak 3 mm (Filling Shed) 
Jet Fire 
- 
Flash Fire 
 
Gas Dispersion 
 
 Leak 10 mm (Filling Shed) 
Jet Fire 
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
0,000 0,010 0,020
km
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Flash Fire 
 
 
 Leak 50 mm (Filling Shed) 
Jet Fire 
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
0,00 0,02 0,04
km
244 
 
 
 
Flash Fire 
 
 
 Leak 150 mm 
Jet Fire 
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
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Flash Fire 
 
 
 Leak 3 mm (Storage System Pipelines) 
Jet Fire 
- 
Flash Fire 
0,00 0,04 0,08
km
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
246 
 
 
 
 
 Leak 10 mm (Storage System Pipeline) 
Jet Fire 
 
Flash Fire 
0,00 0,02
km
0,00 0,02 0,04
km
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 Leak 50 mm (Storage System Pipeline) 
Jet Fire 
 
Flash Fire 
0,00 0,02
km
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
248 
 
 
 
 
 Leak 150 mm (Storage System Pipeline) 
Jet Fire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
0,00 0,04 0,08
km
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Flash Fire 
 
 
 
  
0,000 0,030 0,060
km
250 
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Appendix 7: Risk Representation Recapitulation 
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Category: Jet Fire Bore Diameter 10 mm  
  
 
  
  
        
 
               
No. Receiver Corresponding Node Frequencies Type of Consequences Radius (m) Severity Level Likelihood Level Risk Level No. Of People Affected Mitigation 
1 Jettty MLA 1 4,49E-07 
25 kw/m2 10,03 1 1 1 6 NO 
35 kw/m2 7,48 3 1 3 6 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
2 Metering Station 2 5,02E-07 
25 kw/m2 10,03 1 1 1 2 NO 
35 kw/m2 7,48 3 1 3 2 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
3 Storage Area V110 5 1,36E-17 
25 kw/m2 10,03 1 1 1 0 NO 
35 kw/m2 7,48 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
4 Storage Area V120 5 1,36E-17 
25 kw/m2 10,03 1 1 1 0 NO 
35 kw/m2 7,48 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
5 Storage Area V130 5 1,36E-17 
25 kw/m2 10,03 1 1 1 0 NO 
35 kw/m2 7,48 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
6 Storage Area V140 5 1,36E-17 
25 kw/m2 10,03 1 1 1 0 NO 
35 kw/m2 7,48 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
7 Storage Area System 6 1,17E-06 
25 kw/m2 10,03 1 1 1 5 NO 
35 kw/m2 7,48 3 1 3 5 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
8 Office and Control Room  5 1,36E-17 
25 kw/m2 - 1 1 1 0 NO 
35 kw/m2 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
9 Warehouse 5 9,38E-14 
25 kw/m2 - 1 1 1 0 NO 
35 kw/m2 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
10 Pump house 7 9,38E-14 
25 kw/m2 10,98 1 1 1 1 NO 
35 kw/m2 7,48 3 1 3 1 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
11 Powerhouse 6 1,17E-06 
25 kw/m2 - 1 1 1 0 NO 
35 kw/m2 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
12 Filling Shed 8 1,63E-06 
25 kw/m2 10,98 1 1 1 15 NO 
35 kw/m2 7,48 3 1 3 15 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
13 Skid Tank Parking Area 8 1,63E-06 
25 kw/m2 - 1 1 1 0 NO 
35 kw/m2 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
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Category: Jet Fire Bore Diameter 50 mm 
   
 
  
  
        
                
No. Receiver Corresponding Node Frequencies Type of Consequences Radius (m) Severity Level Likelihood Level Risk Level No. Of People Affected Mitigation 
1 Jetty MLA 1 3,71E-07 
25 kw/m2 36,83 1 1 1 6 NO 
35 kw/m2 27,16 3 1 3 6 NO 
45 kw/m2 17,82 4 1 4 6 YES 
2 Metering Station 2 4,27E-07 
25 kw/m2 36,83 1 1 1 2 NO 
35 kw/m2 27,16 3 1 3 2 NO 
45 kw/m2 17,82 4 1 4 2 YES 
3 Storage Area V110 5 3,38E-19 
25 kw/m2 36,83 1 1 1 5 NO 
35 kw/m2 27,16 3 1 3 5 NO 
45 kw/m2 17,82 4 1 4 0 NO 
4 Storage Area V120 5 3,38E-19 
25 kw/m2 36,83 1 1 1 5 NO 
35 kw/m2 27,16 3 1 3 5 NO 
45 kw/m2 17,82 4 1 4 0 NO 
5 Storage Area V130 5 3,38E-19 
25 kw/m2 36,83 1 1 1 5 NO 
35 kw/m2 27,16 3 1 3 5 NO 
45 kw/m2 17,82 4 1 4 0 NO 
6 Storage Area V140 5 -3,38E-19 
25 kw/m2 36,83 1 1 1 5 NO 
35 kw/m2 27,16 3 1 3 5 NO 
45 kw/m2 17,82 4 1 4 0 NO 
7 Storage Area System 6 1,26E-06 
25 kw/m2 36,83 1 1 1 5 NO 
35 kw/m2 27,16 3 1 3 5 NO 
45 kw/m2 17,82 4 1 4 0 NO 
8 Office and Control Room  5 3,38E-19 
25 kw/m2 - 1 1 1 0 NO 
35 kw/m2 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
9 Warehouse 5 3,38E-19 
25 kw/m2 - 1 1 1 0 NO 
35 kw/m2 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
10 Pump house 7 1,70E-16 
25 kw/m2 34,25 1 1 1 1 NO 
35 kw/m2 24,85 3 1 3 1 NO 
45 kw/m2 13,54 4 1 4 1 NO 
11 Powerhouse 6 1,26E-06 
25 kw/m2 - 1 1 1 0 NO 
35 kw/m2 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
12 Filling Shed 8 7,66E-07 
25 kw/m2 34,25 1 1 1 15 NO 
35 kw/m2 24,85 3 1 3 15 NO 
45 kw/m2 13,54 4 1 4 15 NO 
13 Skid Tank Parking Area 8 7,66E-07 
25 kw/m2 - 1 1 1 0 NO 
35 kw/m2 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
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Category: Jet Fire Bore Diameter 150 mm 
   
 
  
  
        
                
No. Receiver Corresponding Node Frequencies Type of Consequences Radius (m) Severity Level Likelihood Level Risk Level No. Of People Affected Mitigation 
1 Jetty MLA 1 4,60E-07 
25 kw/m2 82,59 1 1 1 6 NO 
35 kw/m2 57,13 3 1 3 6 NO 
45 kw/m2 35,82 4 1 4 6 YES 
2 Metering Station 2 5,52E-07 
25 kw/m2 82,59 1 1 1 2 NO 
35 kw/m2 57,13 3 1 3 2 NO 
45 kw/m2 35,82 4 1 4 2 YES 
3 Storage Area V110 5 5,30E-23 
25 kw/m2 82,59 1 1 1 5 NO 
35 kw/m2 57,13 3 1 3 5 NO 
45 kw/m2 35,82 4 1 4 5 YES 
4 Storage Area V120 5 5,30E-23 
25 kw/m2 82,59 1 1 1 5 NO 
35 kw/m2 57,13 3 1 3 5 NO 
45 kw/m2 35,82 4 1 4 5 YES 
5 Storage Area V130 5 5,30E-23 
25 kw/m2 82,59 1 1 1 5 NO 
35 kw/m2 57,13 3 1 3 5 NO 
45 kw/m2 35,82 4 1 4 5 YES 
6 Storage Area V140 5 5,30E-23 
25 kw/m2 82,59 1 1 1 5 NO 
35 kw/m2 57,13 3 1 3 5 NO 
45 kw/m2 35,82 4 1 4 5 YES 
7 Storage Area System 6 2,80E-06 
25 kw/m2 82,59 1 1 1 5 NO 
35 kw/m2 57,13 3 1 3 5 NO 
45 kw/m2 35,82 4 1 4 5 YES 
8 Office and Control Room  5 5,30E-23 
25 kw/m2 - 1 1 1 0 NO 
35 kw/m2 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
9 Warehouse 5 5,30E-23 
25 kw/m2 - 1 1 1 0 NO 
35 kw/m2 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
10 Pump house 7 1,42E-11 
25 kw/m2 80,72 1 1 1 1 NO 
35 kw/m2 51,11 3 1 3 1 NO 
45 kw/m2 29,76 4 1 4 1 YES 
11 Powerhouse 6 2,80E-06 
25 kw/m2 - 1 1 1 0 NO 
35 kw/m2 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
12 Filling Shed 8 2,83E-06 
25 kw/m2 80,72 1 1 1 15 NO 
35 kw/m2 51,11 3 1 3 15 NO 
45 kw/m2 29,76 4 1 4 15 yes 
13 Skid Tank Parking Area 8 2,83E-06 
25 kw/m2 21,34 1 1 1 20 NO 
35 kw/m2 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
45 kw/m2 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
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Category: Flash Fire Bore Diameter 3 mm 
   
 
  
  
        
                
No. Receiver Corresponding Node Frequencies Type of Consequences Radius (m) Severity Level Likelihood Level Risk Level No. Of People Affected Mitigation 
1 Jetty & MLA 1 1,27E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 1,2 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 0,5 4 1 4 0 NO 
2 Meterring Station 2 1,29E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 1,2 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 0,5 4 1 4 0 NO 
3 Storage Area V110 5 1,97E-17 
4,286 kW/m3 1,2 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 0,5 4 1 4 0 NO 
4 Storage Area V120 5 1,97E-17 
4,286 kW/m3 1,2 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 0,5 4 1 4 0 NO 
5 Storage Area V130 5 1,97E-17 
4,286 kW/m3 1,2 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 0,5 4 1 4 0 NO 
6 Storage Area V140 5 1,97E-17 
4,286 kW/m3 1,2 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 0,5 4 1 4 0 NO 
7 Storage Area System 6 5,45E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 1,2 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 0,5 4 1 4 0 NO 
8 Office and Control Room 5 1,97E-17 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
9 Warehouse 5 1,97E-17 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
10 Pumphouse 7 5,20E-11 
4,286 kW/m3 1,17 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 0,53 4 1 4 0 NO 
11 Powerhouse 6 5,45E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
12 Filling Shed 8 3,65E-04 
4,286 kW/m3 1,17 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 0,53 4 1 4 0 NO 
13 Skid Tank Parking Area 8 3,65E-04 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
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Category: Flash Fire Bore Diameter 10 mm 
   
 
  
  
        
                
No. Receiver Corresponding Node Frequencies Type of Consequences Radius (m) Severity Level Likelihood Level Risk Level No. Of People Affected Mitigation 
1 Jetty & MLA 1 4,94E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 4,03 3 1 3 6 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 1,83 4 1 4 0 NO 
2 Meterring Station 2 5,52E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 3,71 3 1 3 2 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 1,81 4 1 4 0 NO 
3 Storage Area V110 5 7,45E-17 
4,286 kW/m3 3,71 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 1,81 4 1 4 0 NO 
4 Storage Area V120 5 7,45E-17 
4,286 kW/m3 3,71 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 1,81 4 1 4 0 NO 
5 Storage Area V130 5 7,45E-17 
4,286 kW/m3 3,71 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 1,81 4 1 4 0 NO 
6 Storage Area V140 5 7,45E-17 
4,286 kW/m3 3,71 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 1,81 4 1 4 0 NO 
7 Storage Area System 6 1,29E-04 
4,286 kW/m3 4,03 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 1,83 4 1 4 0 NO 
8 Office and Control Room 5 7,45E-17 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
9 Warehouse 5 7,45E-17 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
10 Pumphouse 7 1,03E-11 
4,286 kW/m3 3,91 3 1 3 1 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 1,87 4 1 4 0 NO 
11 Powerhouse 6 1,29E-04 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
12 Filling Shed 8 1,79E-04 
4,286 kW/m3 3,91 3 1 3 5 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 1,87 4 1 4 0 NO 
13 Skid Tank Parking Area 8 1,79E-04 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
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Category: Flash Fire Bore Diameter 50 mm 
   
 
  
  
        
                
No. Receiver Corresponding Node Frequencies Type of Consequences Radius (m) Severity Level Likelihood Level Risk Level No. Of People Affected Mitigation 
1 Jetty & MLA 1 1,65E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 14,38 3 1 3 6 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 8,42 4 1 4 6 YES 
2 Meterring Station 2 1,90E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 14,38 3 1 3 2 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 8,42 4 1 4 2 YES 
3 Storage Area V110 5 7,51E-19 
4,286 kW/m3 20,51 3 1 3 5 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 9,19 4 1 4 5 YES 
4 Storage Area V120 5 7,51E-19 
4,286 kW/m3 20,51 3 1 3 5 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 9,19 4 1 4 5 YES 
5 Storage Area V130 5 7,51E-19 
4,286 kW/m3 20,51 3 1 3 5 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 9,19 4 1 4 5 YES 
6 Storage Area V140 5 7,51E-19 
4,286 kW/m3 20,51 3 1 3 5 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 9,19 4 1 4 5 YES 
7 Storage Area System 6 5,60E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 20,51 3 1 3 5 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 9,19 4 1 4 5 YES 
8 Office and Control Room 5 7,51E-19 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
9 Warehouse 5 7,51E-19 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
10 Pumphouse 7 7,55E-15 
4,286 kW/m3 8,85 3 1 3 1 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 5,38 4 1 4 1 YES 
11 Powerhouse 6 5,60E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
12 Filling Shed 8 3,41E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 8,85 3 1 3 15 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 5,38 4 1 4 15 YES 
13 Skid Tank Parking Area 8 3,41E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
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Category: Flash Fire Bore Diameter 150 mm 
   
 
  
  
        
                
No. Receiver Corresponding Node Frequencies Type of Consequences Radius (m) Severity Level Likelihood Level Risk Level No. Of People Affected Mitigation 
1 Jetty & MLA 1 2,74E-06 
4,286 kW/m3 15,94 3 1 3 6 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 9,5 4 1 4 6 YES 
2 Meterring Station 2 3,28E-06 
4,286 kW/m3 15,94 3 1 3 2 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 9,5 4 1 4 2 YES 
3 Storage Area V110 5 1,58E-23 
4,286 kW/m3 59,19 3 1 3 5 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 32,68 4 1 4 5 YES 
4 Storage Area V120 5 1,58E-23 
4,286 kW/m3 59,19 3 1 3 5 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 32,68 4 1 4 5 YES 
5 Storage Area V130 5 1,58E-23 
4,286 kW/m3 59,19 3 1 3 5 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 32,68 4 1 4 5 YES 
6 Storage Area V140 5 1,58E-23 
4,286 kW/m3 59,19 3 1 3 5 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 32,68 4 1 4 5 YES 
7 Storage Area System 6 1,67E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 59,19 3 1 3 5 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 32,68 4 1 4 5 YES 
8 Office and Control Room 5 1,58E-23 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
9 Warehouse 5 1,58E-23 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
10 Pumphouse 7 8,47E-11 
4,286 kW/m3 9,21 3 1 3 1 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 5,65 4 1 4 1 YES 
11 Powerhouse 6 1,67E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
12 Filling Shed 8 1,68E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 9,21 3 1 3 15 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 5,65 4 1 4 15 YES 
13 Skid Tank Parking Area 8 1,68E-05 
4,286 kW/m3 - 3 1 3 0 NO 
9,107 kW/m3 - 4 1 4 0 NO 
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Category: Explosion Bore Diameter 3 mm  
  
 
  
  
        
 
               
No. Receiver Corresponding Node Frequencies Type of Consequences Radius (m) Severity Level Likelihood Level Risk Level No. Of People Affected Mitigation 
1 Jetty MLA 1 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
2 Metering Station 2 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
3 Storage Area V110 5 3,75E-16 
0,2 bar 7,84 1 1 1 0 NO 
1,3 bar 2,77 3 1 3 0 NO 
2,0 bar 2,37 4 1 4 0 NO 
4 Storage Area V120 5 3,75E-16 
0,2 bar 7,84 1 1 1 0 NO 
1,3 bar 2,77 3 1 3 0 NO 
2,0 bar 2,37 4 1 4 0 NO 
5 Storage Area V130 5 3,75E-16 
0,2 bar 7,84 1 1 1 0 NO 
1,3 bar 2,77 3 1 3 0 NO 
2,0 bar 2,37 4 1 4 0 NO 
6 Storage Area V140 5 3,75E-16 
0,2 bar 7,84 1 1 1 0 NO 
1,3 bar 2,77 3 1 3 0 NO 
2,0 bar 2,37 4 1 4 0 NO 
7 Storage Area System 6 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
8 Office and Control Room  5 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
9 Warehouse 5 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
10 Pump house 7 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
11 Powerhouse 6 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
12 Filling Shed 8 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
13 Skid Tank Parking Area 8 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
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Category: Explosion Bore Diameter 10 mm  
  
 
  
  
        
 
               
No. Receiver Corresponding Node Frequencies Type of Consequences Radius (m) Severity Level Likelihood Level Risk Level No. Of People Affected Mitigation 
1 Jetty MLA 1 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
2 Metering Station 2 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
3 Storage Area V110 5 1,42E-15 
0,2 bar 21,937 1 1 1 5 NO 
1,3 bar 6,42 3 1 3 0 NO 
2,0 bar 5,19 4 1 4 0 NO 
4 Storage Area V120 5 1,42E-15 
0,2 bar 21,937 1 1 1 5 NO 
1,3 bar 6,42 3 1 3 0 NO 
2,0 bar 5,19 4 1 4 0 NO 
5 Storage Area V130 5 1,42E-15 
0,2 bar 21,937 1 1 1 5 NO 
1,3 bar 6,42 3 1 3 0 NO 
2,0 bar 5,19 4 1 4 0 NO 
6 Storage Area V140 5 1,42E-15 
0,2 bar 21,937 1 1 1 5 NO 
1,3 bar 6,42 3 1 3 0 NO 
2,0 bar 5,19 4 1 4 0 NO 
7 Storage Area System 6 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
8 Office and Control Room  5 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
9 Warehouse 5 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
10 Pump house 7 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
11 Powerhouse 6 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
12 Filling Shed 8 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
13 Skid Tank Parking Area 8 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
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Category: Explosion Bore Diameter 50 mm  
 
  
  
  
        
 
               
No. Receiver Corresponding Node Frequencies Type of Consequences Radius (m) Severity Level Likelihood Level Risk Level No. Of People Affected Mitigation 
1 Jetty MLA 1 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
2 Metering Station 2 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
3 Storage Area V110 5 1,43E-17 
0,2 bar 61,02 1 1 1 5 NO 
1,3 bar 16,58 3 1 3 0 NO 
2,0 bar 13,06 4 1 4 0 NO 
4 Storage Area V120 5 1,43E-17 
0,2 bar 61,02 1 1 1 5 NO 
1,3 bar 16,58 3 1 3 0 NO 
2,0 bar 13,06 4 1 4 0 NO 
5 Storage Area V130 5 1,43E-17 
0,2 bar 61,02 1 1 1 5 NO 
1,3 bar 16,58 3 1 3 0 NO 
2,0 bar 13,06 4 1 4 0 NO 
6 Storage Area V140 5 1,43E-17 
0,2 bar 61,02 1 1 1 5 NO 
1,3 bar 16,58 3 1 3 0 NO 
2,0 bar 13,06 4 1 4 0 NO 
7 Storage Area System 6 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
8 Office and Control Room  5 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
9 Warehouse 5 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
10 Pump house 7 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
11 Powerhouse 6 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
12 Filling Shed 8 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
13 Skid Tank Parking Area 8 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
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Category: Explosion Bore Diameter 150 mm 
                
                
No. Receiver Corresponding Node Frequencies Type of Consequences Radius (m) Severity Level Likelihood Level Risk Level No. Of People Affected Mitigation 
1 Jetty MLA 1 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
2 Metering Station 2 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
3 Storage Area V110 5 2,99E-22 
0,2 bar 99,25 1 1 1 5 NO 
1,3 bar 26,44 3 1 3 5 NO 
2,0 bar 20,68 4 1 4 0 NO 
4 Storage Area V120 5 2,99E-22 
0,2 bar 99,25 1 1 1 5 NO 
1,3 bar 26,44 3 1 3 5 NO 
2,0 bar 20,68 4 1 4 0 NO 
5 Storage Area V130 5 2,99E-22 
0,2 bar 99,25 1 1 1 5 NO 
1,3 bar 26,44 3 1 3 5 NO 
2,0 bar 20,68 4 1 4 0 NO 
6 Storage Area V140 5 2,99E-22 
0,2 bar 99,25 1 1 1 5 NO 
1,3 bar 26,44 3 1 3 5 NO 
2,0 bar 20,68 4 1 4 0 NO 
7 Storage Area System 6 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
8 Office and Control Room  5 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
9 Warehouse 5 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
10 Pump house 7 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
11 Powerhouse 6 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
12 Filling Shed 8 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
13 Skid Tank Parking Area 8 - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - 
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Appendix 8: Fire Risk Card 
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Fire Risk Card Terminal LPG Semarang 
Incident Scenario:             
Storage tank V110 encounter 150 mm leak and the gas released become jet fire, 
and Storage Tank V120, V130, V140 in need of auxiliary cooling 
Hazard       Location Description     
Flame Emissivity : 400 kw/m2 Storage V110    
Heat Flux Radiation Zone (m)        
  25 kw/m2 : 82,59       
  35 kw/m2 : 57,13       
  45 kw/m2 : 35,82       
                
Facility Information        
Type of Facility : Storage Tank     
Size  : -      
Capacity  : 2500 MT     
Surface Area        
(for Storage Tank) : 1505,975 m2     
                
Auxiliary Cooling Requirement           
Burnt Tank : V110      
Tank to be         
cooled down : V120, V130, V140     
Pump flow rate        
Requirement : 9721,131 gpm     
Water supply for        
for auxiliary cooling : 8830,676 m3     
                
Minimum Fire Extinguisher Requirement         
Fire Pump flow rate : 403,5584 gpm     
Fire Hose flow rate : 403,5584 gpm     
Water Supply        
for 4 (four) hours : 372,5154 m3     
          
Note               
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Fire Risk Card Terminal LPG Semarang 
Incident Scenario:             
Storage tank V120 encounter 150 mm leak and the gas released become jet fire, and 
Storage Tank V110, V130, V140 in need of auxiliary cooling 
Hazard       Location Description     
Flame Emissivity : 400 kw/m2 Storage V120    
Heat Flux Radiation Zone (m)        
  25 kw/m2 : 82,59       
  35 kw/m2 : 57,13       
  45 kw/m2 : 35,82       
                
Facility Information        
Type of Facility : Storage Tank     
Size  : -      
Capacity  : 2500 MT     
Surface Area        
(for Storage Tank) : 1505,975 m2     
                
Auxiliary Cooling Requirement           
Burnt Tank : V120      
Tank to be         
cooled down : V110, V130, V140     
Pump flow rate        
Requirement : 9721,131 gpm     
Water supply for        
for auxiliary cooling : 8830,676 m3     
                
Minimum Fire Extinguisher Requirement         
Fire Pump flow rate : 403,5584 gpm     
Fire Hose flow rate : 403,5584 gpm     
Water Supply        
for 4 (four) hours : 372,5154 m3     
          
Note               
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Fire Risk Card Terminal LPG Semarang 
Incident Scenario:             
Storage tank V130 encounter 150 mm leak and the gas released become jet fire, 
and Storage Tank V110, V120, V140 in need of auxiliary cooling 
Hazard       Location Description     
Flame Emissivity : 400 kw/m2 Storage V130    
Heat Flux Radiation Zone (m)        
  25 kw/m2 : 82,59       
  35 kw/m2 : 57,13       
  45 kw/m2 : 35,82       
                
Facility Information        
Type of Facility : Storage Tank     
Size  : -      
Capacity  : 2500 MT     
Surface Area        
(for Storage Tank) : 1505,975 m2     
                
Auxiliary Cooling Requirement           
Burnt Tank : V130      
Tank to be         
cooled down : V110, V120, V140     
Pump flow rate        
Requirement : 9721,131 gpm     
Water supply for        
for auxiliary cooling : 8830,676 m3     
                
Minimum Fire Extinguisher Requirement         
Fire Pump flow rate : 403,5584 gpm     
Fire Hose flow rate : 403,5584 gpm     
Water Supply        
for 4 (four) hours : 372,5154 m3     
          
Note               
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Fire Risk Card Terminal LPG Semarang 
Incident Scenario:             
Storage tank V140 encounter 150 mm leak and the gas released become jet fire, and 
Storage Tank V110, V120, V140 in need of auxiliary cooling 
Hazard       Location Description     
Flame Emissivity : 400 kw/m2 Storage V140    
Heat Flux Radiation Zone (m)        
  25 kw/m2 : 82,59       
  35 kw/m2 : 57,13       
  45 kw/m2 : 35,82       
                
Facility Information        
Type of Facility : Storage Tank     
Size  : -      
Capacity  : 2500 MT     
Surface Area        
(for Storage Tank) : 1505,975 m2     
                
Auxiliary Cooling Requirement           
Burnt Tank : V140      
Tank to be         
cooled down : V110, V120, V130     
Pump flow rate        
Requirement : 9721,131 gpm     
Water supply for        
for auxiliary cooling : 8830,676 m3     
                
Minimum Fire Extinguisher Requirement         
Fire Pump flow rate : 403,5584 gpm     
Fire Hose flow rate : 403,5584 gpm     
Water Supply        
for 4 (four) hours : 372,5154 m3     
          
Note               
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Fire Risk Card Terminal LPG Semarang 
Incident Scenario:             
Metering Station encounter 150 mm Jet Fire and need fire extinguisher 
Hazard       
Location 
Description     
Flame Emissivity : 400 kw/m2 Metering Station    
Heat Flux Radiation Zone (m)        
  25 kw/m2 : 82,59       
  35 kw/m2 : 57,13       
  45 kw/m2 : 35,82       
                
Facility Information        
Type of Facility : Pipe with flow rate indicator    
Size  : 10 inch     
Capacity  : 300 ton/hr     
Surface Area        
(for Storage Tank) : - m2     
                
Auxiliary Cooling Requirement           
Burnt Tank : -      
Tank to be         
cooled down : -      
Pump flow rate        
Requirement : -      
Water supply for        
for auxiliary cooling : -      
                
Minimum Fire Extinguisher Requirement         
Fire Pump flow rate : 403,5323 gpm     
Fire Hose flow rate : 403,5323 gpm     
Water Supply        
for 4 (four) hours : 372,4914 m3     
          
Note               
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Fire Risk Card Terminal LPG Semarang 
Incident Scenario:             
MLA and Jetty Area encounter 150 mm Jet Fire and need fire extinguisher 
Hazard       Location Description     
Flame Emissivity : 400 kw/m2 Jetty and MLA    
Heat Flux Radiation Zone (m)        
  25 kw/m2 : 82,59       
  35 kw/m2 : 57,13       
  45 kw/m2 : 35,82       
                
Facility Information        
Type of Facility : Marine Loading Arm and pipe connection   
Size  : 10 inch     
Capacity  : 300 ton/hr     
Surface Area        
(for Storage Tank) : - m2     
                
Auxiliary Cooling Requirement           
Burnt Tank : -      
Tank to be         
cooled down : -      
Pump flow rate        
Requirement : -      
Water supply for        
for auxiliary cooling : -      
                
Minimum Fire Extinguisher Requirement         
Fire Pump flow rate : 403,5323 gpm     
Fire Hose flow rate : 403,5323 gpm     
Water Supply        
for 4 (four) hours : 372,4914 m3     
          
Note               
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Fire Risk Card Terminal LPG Semarang 
Incident Scenario:             
Pump house encounter 150 mm Jet Fire and need fire extinguisher 
Hazard       Location Description     
Flame Emissivity : 400 kw/m2 Pump house    
Heat Flux Radiation Zone (m)        
  25 kw/m2 : 80,72       
  35 kw/m2 : 51,11       
  45 kw/m2 : 29,76       
                
Facility Information        
Type of Facility : Pipe with flow rate indicator    
Size  : 6 inch     
Capacity  : 30-60 ton/hr     
Surface Area        
(for Storage Tank) : - m2     
                
Auxiliary Cooling Requirement           
Burnt Tank : -      
Tank to be         
cooled down : -      
Pump flow rate        
Requirement : -      
Water supply for        
for auxiliary cooling : -      
                
Minimum Fire Extinguisher Requirement         
Fire Pump flow rate : 403,6739 gpm     
Fire Hose flow rate : 403,6739 gpm     
Water Supply        
for 4 (four) hours : 372,6221 m3     
          
Note               
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Fire Risk Card Terminal LPG Semarang 
Incident Scenario:             
Filling Shed encounter 150 mm Jet Fire and need fire extinguisher 
Hazard       Location Description     
Flame Emissivity : 400 kw/m2 Filling Shed    
Heat Flux Radiation Zone (m)        
  25 kw/m2 : 80,72       
  35 kw/m2 : 51,11       
  45 kw/m2 : 29,76       
                
Facility Information        
Type of Facility : Pipe with flow rate indicator    
Size  : 3 inch     
Capacity  : 15 ton/hr.     
Surface Area        
(for Storage Tank) : - m2     
                
Auxiliary Cooling Requirement           
Burnt Tank : -      
Tank to be         
cooled down : -      
Pump flow rate        
Requirement : -      
Water supply for        
for auxiliary cooling : -      
                
Minimum Fire Extinguisher Requirement         
Fire Pump flow rate : 403,6618 gpm     
Fire Hose flow rate : 403,6618 gpm     
Water Supply        
for 4 (four) hours : 372,6109 m3     
          
Note               
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